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Author’s Note 
The following convention is used in this thesis for the naming of military units and formations: 
 Armies: The names of German and Axis armies are spelled in full (Seventeenth Army, 
First Panzer Army, Romanian Third Army), whereas Soviet Armies are denoted using 
Arabic numerals (18th Army, 5th Guards Army). 
 Corps: German Corps are denoted using Roman numerals (V Corps, XXXXIX Mountain 
Corps), whereas Soviet Corps are represented by Arabic numerals (20th Corps).  At 
certain times during the campaign in the Kuban, V Corps and XXXXIV Corps were 
known by the names Gruppe Wetzel and Gruppe de Angelis, respectively. For 
simplicity, these names are not used in this thesis. 
 Divisions: All divisions and smaller units on both sides are named using Arabic 
numerals (97th Jäger Division, 83rd Marine Infantry Brigade). On occasion “German” or 
“Soviet” is added for clarity. 
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Introduction 
David M. Glantz, one of the foremost scholars of the Soviet-German war of 1941-5, 
makes frequent reference to what he calls the “forgotten battles” of the war, the many 
operations that are partially or completely overlooked in the published history. These 
operations are understandably obscured by more famous events, such as the initial 
German advance in the summer of 1941, the Battles of Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk 
and the huge Soviet offensives of the later period of the war.1 Glantz argues, however, 
that a comprehensive understanding of the war cannot be gained without some 
knowledge of these forgotten battles, as they accounted for upwards of 40 percent of 
the Red Army’s total wartime operations. There are a number of reasons why this 
situation has come about. Access to Soviet/Russian sources has long been a major 
challenge for Western historians, and even many Russian researchers have been forced 
to ignore or gloss over facts or events considered politically embarrassing or 
inconvenient.  The early English-language histories, which formed the Western view of 
the war that has largely persisted to the present day, were forced to rely heavily on the 
memoirs of German generals such as Heinz Guderian, Friedrich von Mellenthin, and 
Erich von Manstein, which were written from personal notes without the use of archive 
materials and naturally presented a one-sided view of events.2 
The operations in the Kuban bridgehead, the subject of this thesis, can certainly be 
included in the ranks of the forgotten battles. Indeed the entire campaign in the 
Caucasus during 1942-3 is often viewed as merely a footnote to the Battle of Stalingrad, 
even though the oilfields were the primary objective of Operation Blue, the 
Wehrmacht’s 1942 summer offensive, and the forces sent to the Volga were initially 
intended to act as a screen for the advance to the south. The Kuban bridgehead, which 
was held by the German Seventeenth Army from January to October 1943, receives 
even less attention. As an example, John Erickson’s The Road to Berlin devotes several 
early pages to the Soviet offensives and German withdrawal that led to the pocket being 
                                                          
1
 David M. Glantz, The Soviet-German war 1941-1945: myths and realities: a survey essay, 
Presented as the 20th Anniversary Distinguished Lecture at the Strom Thurmond Institute of 
Government and Public Affairs. Clemson University, South Carolina, 11 October 2001. Available at 
http://sti.clemson.edu/publications-mainmenu-38/commentaries-mainmenu-211/cat_view/33-
strom-thurmond-institute/153-sti-publications-by-subject-area/158-history (27 Nov. 2013). 
2
 David M. Glantz, Colossus reborn: The Red Army at war, 1941-1943, (Kansas, 2005), pp xv-xvii.  
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formed, then briefly mentions the Soviet plans to eliminate the bridgehead, but the next 
mention of Seventeenth Army sees it in the Crimea in October 1943 following its 
evacuation over the Strait of Kerch from the Kuban, which is not discussed at all.3 
 
Figure 1: The Kuban and Crimea 
 Even within the sparse coverage of the actions as a whole, certain aspects have 
received more attention than others. Aerial combat and amphibious operations, for 
example, have received some attention, whereas the Soviet ground offensives have 
been almost completely overlooked. A simple explanation for this may be gleaned from 
a single table in Glantz’s Colossus Reborn: while other Soviet offensives around the same 
time achieved advances of hundreds of kilometres, the gains in the Kuban were a mere 
four to twelve kilometres.4 
Given Glantz’s fame as a scholar of the Red Army, his advice to historians studying 
lesser-known aspects of the war on the Eastern Front may initially be somewhat 
surprising. In light of the issues discussed above, he recommends that the records of 
Wehrmacht formations in the German archives, including daily operational and 
                                                          
3
 John Erickson, The road to Berlin: Stalin’s war with Germany volume two, (London, 1999), pp 28-
32, 59, 122-3. 
4
 Glantz, Colossus reborn, p. 129. In comparison, Western Front’s Operation Suvorov in the 
Smolensk region gained 200 - 250 km, Central Front’s post-Kursk Operation Kutuzov achieved 150 
km and Southwestern Front’s Chernigov-Poltava Operation reached as far as 250 - 300 km.   
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intelligence maps, provide the best means of identifying Soviet as well as German 
operations, down to quite low levels.5 
Primary Sources 
The primary research for this thesis was conducted in the Military Archives Department 
of the German Federal Archive (Bundesarchiv) in Freiburg-im-Breisgau, Baden-
Württemberg, which contains the surviving records of all Prussian and German military 
forces from 1867 to the present day.6 In the Bundesarchiv’s collection, Seventeenth 
Army’s war diary (Kriegstagebuch) is divided into ten chronological sections, each 
typically covering a three – six-month period. For this thesis, the sections of particular 
interest were No. 6, which spans the period from 1 February to 30 June 1943, and No. 7, 
which covers 1 July – 9 October 1943. Each of these sections is complemented by a 
number of supplementary files, including orders of battle, collections of orders and 
communications, maps, etc. The supplements to No. 6 used for this thesis were orders 
of battle (5 Feb. – 25 June), operational files (14 March – 25 June), communications from 
corps (21 March – 1 May) and communications to Army Group A (16 April – 30 June). 
Two supplements to No. 7 were consulted: a collection of files on the withdrawal (4 
September – 7 October) and a collection of orders and communications from General of 
Pioneers Erwin Jaenecke, who assumed command of Seventeenth Army from General 
Richard Ruoff on 25 June and remained in command throughout the evacuation across 
the Kerch Strait. Two sections of the war diary of V Corps (Nos. 10 and 11) were 
examined in relation to the defence against the Soviet landings at Novorossiysk in 
February 1943, and a collection of combat reports submitted by XXXXIX Mountain Corps 
during the withdrawal from the Kuban was also used. 
An interesting, although not especially useful, contemporary document is a guidebook 
that was published to accompany an exhibition about the operations of the 97th Jäger 
Division in the Kuban, which was held in the division's home city of Bad Tölz in Bavaria in 
the spring of 1944. The booklet features a number of personal accounts written by 
veterans of the campaign and artwork produced by some of the soldiers. Its worth as a 
historical source, however, is limited due to a significant lack of specific information, 
                                                          
5
 Glantz, Myths and realities, pp 108-9. 
6 Bundesarchiv: Department Military Archives (Department MA) 
http://www.bundesarchiv.de/bundesarchiv/organisation/abteilung_ma/index.html.en (28 
November 2013). 
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which is most likely due to the twin demands of wartime censorship and propaganda. 
The effects of censorship can be seen in the almost complete absence of specific details 
about dates, places, and events. The clearest example of this is that the division is not 
named anywhere in the document, although it is relatively easy to identify it by using 
other sources. Dates are also lacking, with only a few of the accounts even mentioning a 
specific month. As would be expected from publically available wartime documents, 
there is a significant element of propaganda in the guidebook. It is filled with heavily 
descriptive pieces glorifying the division's troops and sentimental paeans to the dead. A 
typical passage from the opening paragraphs of the first account reads: “A Division of 
Bavarian Jäger took part in this powerful defensive success. These are men from 
Berchtesgadener Land, from Cheimgau and the Inn Valley, from the Loisach and Isar 
regions, from Ammergau and Lechgau, who all have been the bravest of soldiers since 
the opening offensives against the enemy on the Eastern Front. Waves upon waves of 
attacking Bolshevik units have failed against the wall of strong and stout hearts of our 
proud sons from Upper Bavaria, stationed in the east at the Straits at Kerch.” 7 
Secondary Sources 
As has already been discussed, the operations in the Caucasus region, and in particular 
the defence of the Kuban bridgehead following the retreat of the bulk of Army Group A, 
are poorly covered in the English-language literature. Most general books on the war 
devote at most a few pages to the campaigns, although a small number do provide a 
more in-depth examination. 
 One book that focuses exclusively on the battles in the Caucasus is The Caucasus and 
the Oil: the German-Soviet war in the Caucasus 1942/43 (Winnipeg, 1995) by Wilhelm 
Tieke, a former officer in the Finnish Volunteer battalion of the Waffen SS.8 This is a 
translation of a German-language book that was originally published in 1970, and it 
covers the period from the German capture of Rostov-on-Don in July 1942 to the final 
withdrawal from the Kuban Bridgehead in October 1943. A major concern over the book 
                                                          
7
 Augustin Peter Kollmuß, ‘Sechs monate Kubanbrückenkopf‘ in M. Hartmann (ed.), Jäger am 
Kuban: ausstellung einer Oberbayr. Jäger division in verbindung mit dem stellv. Gen. Kdo. VII. A.K. 
Bad Tölz 26.3-16.4. 1944 (Bad Tölz, 1944), p.8. (Available at 
https://archive.org/details/Hartmann-M-Jaeger-am-Kuban) (7 Jan. 2014). 
8
 Axis History: Finnisches Freiwilligen Bataillon der Waffen SS: 
http://www.axishistory.com/122-germany-waffen-ss/germany-waffen-ss-minor-units/1396-
finnisches-freiwilligen-bataillon-der-waffen-ss (5 Jan. 2014). 
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is the complete absence of any bibliography or citation of sources. In a short afterword, 
Tieke thanks the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Military History Research 
Department) of the German Armed Forces in Potsdam, the Bundesarchiv/Abteilung 
Militärachiv (Federal Archive/Military Archive Department) in Freiburg-im-Breisgau and 
the Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte (Library of Contemporary History) in Stuttgart, as well 
as a number of former Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS personnel, but no source documents 
are cited in the book. Some questions must also be raised over the quality and accuracy 
of the translation. For example, one error that is repeated several times is a reference to 
the 73rd Infantry Division as being French. The division was in fact based in Nürnberg and 
raised from the city and the surrounding region of Franconia,9 which presumably gave 
rise to confusion in the translator’s mind due to the similarities between the German 
words for France and Franconia (Frankreich and Franken, respectively). An error as basic 
as this raises concerns over the accuracy of the rest of the translation. The text of the 
book is quite dense, so it by no means easy to read and is definitely more suited for 
examinations of particular actions than for reading from cover to cover.  
Paul Carell’s Scorched earth: The German-Russian war 1943-1944 (Pennsylvania, 1994) is 
one of several books that examine the operations in the Caucasus as part of a narrative 
of a larger part of the war. Carell, whose real name was Paul Karl Schmidt, worked in the 
press department of Joachim von Ribbentrop’s Foreign Ministry.10 The structure of the 
book is quite unusual in that it begins by describing the battle of Kursk in July 1943, 
before backtracking about six months to recount the retreat from the Caucasus and a 
series of battles around Leningrad. It then jumps forward again to describe the Soviet 
recapture of Ukraine in the autumn of 1943 and spring of 1944 and finally, the collapse 
of Army Group Centre in Belorussia in the summer of 1944. It devotes a section of about 
20 pages to the Soviet amphibious landings at Novorossiysk in early February 1943 and 
the subsequent, unsuccessful, German efforts to eliminate the beachhead, but neglects 
the summer battles and the final withdrawal.  Carell and the book’s translator Ewald 
Osers are skilled writers, and Scorched Earth is by far the most accessible of the 
translated German books discussed here.   
                                                          
9
Lexikon der Wehrmacht: 73. Infanterie-Division: 
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gliederungen/Infanteriedivisionen/73ID-R.htm (4 Jan. 
2014). 
10
 Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II, The myth of the eastern front: the Nazi-Soviet war in 
American popular culture (Cambridge, 2008), p. 115. 
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A third book of interest is Werner Haupt’s Army Group South: The Wehrmacht in Russia 
1941-1945 (Pennsylvania, 1998). As with Carell, “Werner Haupt” is a pseudonym: the 
author’s real name was Georg Tessin.11  As the title suggests, the book is a broad history 
of the operations of Army Group South throughout the war. It devotes a section of 
about 15 pages to the actions in the Kuban. Haupt has quite an unusual writing style, in 
which he quotes often lengthy passages from personal memoirs to describe small 
engagements, with a series of these passages being combined to provide a “bigger 
picture” of major operations. This, combined with a rather unwieldy translation, makes 
reading the book quite laborious. There is no bibliography, although secondary sources 
are cited in the text, along with a small number of primary sources, typically military 
communications. 
All three books, despite their considerable flaws, are generally accurate with regards to 
the overall sequences of events they describe. They have attracted some criticism for 
their sanitised portrayal of the war and obvious pro-German viewpoint. Carell has been 
the subject of particular controversy due to his wartime service record, most notably his 
involvement in, or at the very least advance knowledge of, the deportation of Jews from 
Budapest.12 
The opposing viewpoint of the battles in the Caucasus is represented by a small number 
of Soviet-era books that have been translated into English. The most useful of these is 
Andrei Grechko’s Battle for the Caucasus (Hawaii, 2001), which was originally published 
in Russian in 1971. Grechko commanded several armies under the North Caucasus Front 
through 1942 and 1943 and after the war he rose through the ranks to serve as Minister 
for Defence from 1967 until his death in 1976.13 As with the German books, Grechko 
presents a generally accurate account of events, once the reader has overcome the 
ever-present propaganda, which is even more overt than in the German books. The 
description on the book’s jacket gives a good indication of what is contained within: 
“Like a mighty mountain torrent the entire mass of Soviet troops swept the Germans out 
                                                          
11
 Feldgrau.net: Interesting fact on Werner Haupt: 
http://www.feldgrau.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=24&t=33998 (8 Jan. 2014). 
12
 Wigbert Benz, Paul Karl Schmidts (alias Paul Carell) propagandistische Vorschläge zur 
Ermöglichung und Rechtfertigung der Ermordung der Budapester Juden 1944. Available at 
http://www.historisches-centrum.de/forum/benz03-2.html (8 Jan. 2014). 
13
 Geroi strany: Grechko, Andrei Antonovich: 
http://www.warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=1225 (9 June 2014). 
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of the North Caucasus. It was a magnificent display of the power of Soviet arms, and the 
fraternity and friendship of the Soviet peoples.“ The next sentence, apparently without 
irony, is: “The author objectively examines every phase of the great battle and 
reinforces his conclusions with documents.” 
A thoroughly unreliable account of events in the Kuban region comes from Leonid 
Brezhnev: the future General Secretary of the Communist Party and leader of the Soviet 
Union served as a political officer with 18th Army at Novorossiysk during 1943. He later 
devoted the first volume of his ghost-written Trilogy of memoirs, entitled Malaya 
Zemlya (The Small Land) (Moscow, 1978), to the events. Between eulogies to the mass 
heroism of the Soviet people, Brezhnev spends much of the book highlighting the 
importance of the speeches that he delivered and the pamphlets that he produced and 
claiming that the military commanders were keen to listen to and act on his advice.14 
Malaya Zemlya and its sequels Vozrozhdenie (Rebirth) and Tselina (Virgin Lands) were 
published to rapturous official acclaim and Brezhnev was quickly awarded the Lenin 
Prize for Literature. The three books were just one element of the personality cult that 
exaggerated and glorified Brezhnev’s wartime service in an effort to place him within 
the Great Patriotic War myth, which had become a key facet of the Soviet regime’s 
legitimacy. Ultimately, however, the increasingly overblown nature of this war hero 
image led merely to ridicule that undermined the cult and Brezhnev’s public standing.15  
Unsurprisingly, the memoirs have faded into obscurity today,16 although a recent poll 
revealed Brezhnev’s rehabilitation in Russian public opinion by naming him the country’s 
most popular 20th-century leader.17  
A rare original English-language account of events in the Kuban is provided by David 
Middleworth’s  ‘The Evacuation of the Kuban Bridgehead, A Model Retrograde 
                                                          
14 Daniel Kalder, ‘Dictator-lit: Comrade Brezhnev goes to war’ in The Guardian, 9 October 2009. 
Available at http://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2009/oct/09/dictator-lit-leonid-
brezhnev-malaya-zemlya (6 Jan. 2014). 
15
 Adrianne Nolan, ‘”Shitting Medals”: L. I. Brezhnev, the Great Patriotic War, and the failure of 
the personality cult, 1965-1982’ (M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2008), p. 
ii. 
16
 Kalder, ‘Dictator-lit’ 
17 Alexander Kolyandr, ‘Brezhnev tops list of most popular 20th-Century Moscow rulers’ in Wall 
Street Journal, 22 May 2013.  
Available at http://blogs.wsj.com/emergingeurope/2013/05/22/brezhnev-tops-list-of-most-
popular-20th-century-moscow-rulers/ (6 Jan. 2014). 
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Movement,’ which is contained in War, Revolution and Peace (Maryland, 1987), a 
collection of essays edited by Joachim Remak and published in honour of Charles B. 
Burdick of San Jose State University in California. Middleworth draws from a 
combination of archive documents, personal memoirs and secondary sources to vividly 
describe the withdrawal through the series of prepared defensive lines and the 
amphibious evacuation across the Kerch Strait, although he does not provide any detail 
on the battles of the spring and summer. 
This survey illustrates that the English-language literature on the actions in the Kuban 
bridgehead during 1943 is extremely limited, in common with many other lesser-known 
events on the Eastern Front. A wealth of new material on the war is now being 
published, and there are many opportunities for historians who are able to overcome 
the obstacles discussed earlier to produce valuable work that sheds light on the most 
destructive war in history.    
Thesis Outline 
After a short first chapter describing the operations of the Army Group South and Army 
Group A from the launch of Operation Blue in late June 1942 until the isolation of 
Seventeenth Army in the Kuban in the early weeks of 1943, the main body of this thesis 
comprises three chapters.  
Chapter Two examines two Soviet amphibious landing operations at Novorossiysk at the 
start of February 1942. The main landing at Yuzhnaya Ozereika was a disastrous failure, 
whereas a diversionary landing at Stanichka in the southern suburbs of Novorossiysk 
gained a beachhead, which was quickly strengthened by diverting forces intended for 
the main landing and was held until Novorossiysk was recaptured in September.  
Chapter Three examines Operation Neptune, an unsuccessful German attempt to 
destroy the Soviet beachhead at Novorossiysk in April 1943, before briefly discussing the 
Soviet offensives against the bridgehead through the late spring and summer months. 
Finally, Chapter Four examines the withdrawal of the Seventeenth Army through a series 
of prepared defensive positions and then across the Kerch Strait to the Crimea. In total, 
almost a quarter of a million men, over 70,000 horses, almost 50,000 vehicles and over 
9 
 
100,000 tons of supplies were evacuated by sea, and another 15,000 men were airlifted 
out, with very light losses.18   
The subsequent analysis suggests some possible reasons why a region of the front that 
was of vital strategic importance to both sides in the early part of the war quickly 
became a secondary concern and subsequently slipped into obscurity. It also argues that 
the failure of the landing operation at Yuzhnaya Ozereika denied the Soviets an 
opportunity to quickly clear the German forces from the Kuban region, despite the 
success of the diversionary landing at Stanichka. This failure was subsequently 
compounded by the complete inability of Soviet air and naval forces to implement a sea 
blockade, which enabled the Germans to maintain a continuous supply route across the 
Kerch Strait and allowed Seventeenth Army to hold the bridgehead for eight months. 
   
  
                                                          
18
 Tieke, The Caucasus and the oil, pp 379-80. 
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Chapter I: The Operations of Seventeenth Army, June 1941 – 
January 1943 
Seventeenth Army was established on 13 December 1940, under the command of 
General Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel.19 For the offensive against the Soviet Union, it was 
assigned to Army Group South, which was commanded by Field Marshal Gerd von 
Rundstedt. Because of the huge extent of this sector, the army group was split into two 
parts: to the north of the Carpathian Mountains, Seventeenth was joined by Sixth and 
First Panzer Armies, while the southern grouping comprised the German Eleventh and 
Romanian Third and Fourth Armies.20 Seventeenth Army struck at the junction between 
the Rava-Russkaya and Przemysl fortified districts, aiming initially to break through to 
Lvov, but met the relatively well-organised and prepared defences of General Mikhail 
Kirponos’s Southwestern Front and faced a much tougher fight through the first Soviet 
positions than in many other sectors of the front. On the second day of the offensive, 
however, the infantry located a weak spot between the two fortified districts and tore a 
wide gap between the defending 6th and 26th Armies, opening the path to Lvov, which 
fell on the night of 29 – 30 June.21 
As the offensive tore eastwards, Stavka believed that the entire northern grouping of 
Army Group Centre was headed directly for Kiev and ordered Kirponos to launch attacks 
against the spearheads of First Panzer Group, but this proved unsuccessful. Only after 
von Rundstedt launched the whole of the northern group against 5th Army did Kirponos 
belatedly realise that the German aim was to encircle large Soviet forces before the 
drive on Kiev was launched.22  On 19 July, Führer Directive No. 33 described the 
encirclement of Muzychenko’s 6th and Ponedelin’s 12th Armies, and on 2 August, troops 
of Seventeenth Army’s 1st Mountain Division and First Panzer Group’s 9th Panzer Division 
linked up on the Sinyucha River, closing what became known as the Uman Pocket.23 
After a last attempt to break out of the encirclement, the two Soviet armies capitulated 
                                                          
19
 Lexikon der Wehrmacht: 17. Armee: 
 http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gliederungen/Armeen/17Armee.htm (13 May 2014). 
20
 Chris Bellamy, Absolute war: Soviet Russia in the Second World War (London, 2008), p. 181. 
21 John Erickson, The road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s war with Germany volume one (London, 2000)., 
p. 166. 
22
 Bellamy, Absolute war, p. 257. 
23
 Haupt, Army Group South, p. 36. 
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three days later, yielding a haul of 107,000 prisoners that included both army 
commanders, four corps commanders and eleven division commanders.24 
 
Figure 2: The Uman Pocket
25
 
Following the conclusion of the fighting at Uman, the commanders of Seventeenth and 
First Panzer Armies received orders to regroup and continue the advance eastwards 
towards the Dnieper River, and by mid-August, most of the western bank of the river as 
far south as Dnepropetrovsk was in German hands.26  On 29 August, Seventeenth Army’s 
LII Corps and Eleventh Army’s XI Corps forced a crossing over the river at Derievka, just 
south of Kremenchug, and by the next morning, they had established a 4-kilometre wide 
bridgehead that was significantly expanded over the following days.27 The breakout of 
First Panzer Group from the bridgehead was one of the keys to the massive 
encirclement at Kiev in which Southwestern Front was virtually erased from the map, 
                                                          
24
 Bellamy, Absolute war, p. 257. 
25
 Brian Taylor, Barbarossa to Berlin, a chronology of the campaigns on the eastern front 1941-45: 
volume one: The Long Drive East, 22 June 1941 to November 1942 (Kent, 2003), p. 106. 
26
 Haupt, Army Group South, pp 41, 51. 
27
 Ibid., p. 63. 
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with over 600,000 prisoners being taken by the Germans. As this was occurring, 
Seventeenth Army was again forging eastward, taking Poltava on 19 September.28  
On 6 October, Colonel-General Hermann Hoth took over command of Seventeenth Army 
from von Stülpnagel.29 Kramatorsk was taken on 27 October,30 but III Panzer Corps’ 
sweep south to take Rostov-on-Don on 20 November opened a significant gap between 
First Panzer and Seventeenth Armies. Marshal Timoshenko and Colonel-General 
Cherechivenko, the Southern Front Commander, launched a furious counter-attack that 
retook Rostov and threatened the flanks and rear of III Panzer Corps. When von 
Rundstedt proposed a withdrawal behind the Mius River, Hitler replaced him with Field 
Marshal Walter von Reichenau, who had been in command of Sixth Army, only to 
eventually authorise the proposed withdrawal. Additional units were transferred from 
Kharkov to stabilise the position, meaning they could not be used to support the drive 
on Moscow.31 
In January 1942, Marshal Timoshenko launched an attack that aimed to cut off 1st 
Panzer Army on the Middle Don by advancing across the Middle Donets and on towards 
the towns of Barvenkovo and Lozovaya, between Kharkov and Stalino (Donetsk). These 
objectives were not achieved, but a significant salient was created around Barvenkovo, 
around 80 miles southeast of Kharkov.  This bulge played a major role in subsequent 
plans for an attack on Kharkov, which was launched on 12 May by three armies 
attacking from the east and General Gorodiansky’s 6th Army attacking out of the salient. 
In response, the Germans launched Operation Fridericus on 17 May, with First Panzer 
Army and Seventeenth Army moving from the south against the neck of the salient. 
Gorodiansky was forced to turn 180° to meet the threat. Sixth Army then joined the 
attack from the north, and the salient was cut off on 23 May, thus trapping 
Gorodiansky’s forces. The Kharkov offensive was a disaster for the Soviets, who lost 
between 18 and 20 divisions and a huge quantity of equipment.32 
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On 1 June, General Richard Ruoff assumed command of Seventeenth Army.33 On 28 June 
the first phase of Operation Blue, the German summer offensive in the south was 
launched. The initial phase of the plan called for a pincer operation extending from 
Kursk on the left wing to the Black Sea on the right to encircle and destroy the Soviet 
armies that remained on the western side of the Don, with the pincers meeting at 
Kalach. The advance into the Caucasus would then be launched.34 Timoshenko’s 
Southwestern Front, which was severely weakened after the Kharkov disaster, soon 
began to collapse under the weight of Sixth Army’s assault, and in the south, 
Seventeenth and First Panzer Armies hit Southern Front.35 Despite these early successes, 
however, the anticipated encirclements did not occur, as on 13 July Stavka ordered 
Soviet formations on the western side of the Don to withdraw over the river to 
regroup.36 
Army Group South was split in two on 10 July. Army Group A was commanded by Field 
Marshal Wilhelm List and comprised the Seventeenth, First Panzer and (after 14 July) 
Fourth Panzer Armies. Army Group B, under Fedor von Bock, was made up of the 
German Sixth, Hungarian Second, Italian Eighth and Romanian Third Armies. 
Seventeenth, along with First and Fourth Panzer, was committed to an attack on Rostov, 
which fell on 23 July. On the same day, Hitler issued Directive no. 45, which ordered 
Seventeenth, along with the Romanian Third Army to take the entire eastern coast of 
the Black Sea down to Batumi, while First and Fourth Panzer Armies would take the 
oilfields of Maikop before striking east towards the Caspian Sea. 37 
The attacking formations made rapid progress across the flat steppe region between the 
Don and Kuban Rivers, achieving breakthroughs of up to 40 miles in the first two days, 
but again the Soviets pulled back to avoid encirclements.38  On 10 August, 9th and 73rd 
Infantry Divisions and 1st Mountain Division broke into Krasnodar, the largest city of the 
Kuban region, completing its capture two days later.39 It was around this time, however, 
that the situation began to change. Fourth Panzer Army was transferred north to bolster 
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the drive on Stalingrad, and was followed later by the Third Romanian Army.  With the 
transfer of Eleventh Army to the Leningrad Front, the offensive against the Caucasus 
was ultimately reduced from the planned five armies to just two.40 
During the middle of August, Seventeenth Army crossed the Kuban on both sides of 
Krasnodar and began its push towards the ports of Novorossiysk and Tuapse. V Corps, 
with 73rd and 125th Infantry Divisions, reached the outskirts of Novorossiysk at the end 
of the month, and around the same time, XXXXII Corps took the Taman Peninsula, but 
VII Panzer Corps and XXXXIV Corps were unable to force their way through the 
mountains to Tuapse.41 
V Corps took the city centre and port of Novorossiysk on 10 September, but the 
defending Soviet 47th Army regrouped and dug in around an industrial sector in the 
eastern suburbs of the city that guarded the coast road to the south. Between 12 and 24 
September, 73rd Infantry Division attempted to force a way through these defences, but 
was unable to do so. An attempt by the Romanian 3rd Mountain Division to break 
through to the road was also repulsed with heavy losses. There was further indecisive 
fighting through October, before both sides began to dig in for the winter and major 
operations were halted.42  
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Figure 3: Army Group A’s Withdrawal from the Caucasus
43
 
In late November, as the noose was closing around Sixth Army and much of Fourth 
Panzer Army at Stalingrad, the Soviet command was planning an even greater stroke. 
Operation Saturn would use three armies of Southwestern Front (1st Guards, 3rd Guards 
and 5th Tank) to smash the Italian Eighth Army on the Don and cross the Donets at 
Kamesnk before wheeling south, with 2nd Guards Army being added as a second echelon, 
to take Rostov and trap Army Group A in the Caucasus. Fortunately for the latter, if not 
for the encircled forces, the Stalingrad pocket was much larger than originally thought, 
and with 2nd Guards Army being committed to its reduction, the plan for an immediate 
drive to Rostov was removed from the downgraded Operation Little Saturn.44 
The threat to Army Group A remained serious, however, and over the New Year period, 
Hitler was finally persuaded to withdraw the two armies that remained in the Caucasus, 
before changing his mind and ordering them to pull back to the Kuban bridgehead.45 On 
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29 December, the commander of the Transcaucasus Front, General Ivan Tyulenev, was 
ordered to prepare for an operation to encircle the whole of Army Group A. 
Transcaucasus Front was to attack from the south through Krasnodar to Tikhoretsk, 
about 100 miles to the northeast, where it would link up with forces of Southern Front 
(which was renamed Stalingrad Front on New Year’s Day) moving down from the north 
to cut off the retreat of First Panzer Army.46 First Panzer Army began withdrawing from 
deep in the Caucasus on 1 January, and as it pulled back to the Kuma River over the next 
few days, the adjoining left wing of Seventeenth Army began pulling out of its positions 
in the mountains above Tuapse.47 General Ivan Maslennikov, the commander of the 
Northern Group of Transcaucasus Front, failed dismally in his effort to cut off First 
Panzer from the south, allowing it to continue its withdrawal in relatively good order.48 
It was only on 24 January that Hitler finally agreed to bring the whole of First Panzer 
Group through Rostov and out of the Caucasus, meaning that Seventeenth Army alone 
would be withdrawn into the Kuban bridgehead, supposedly to act as a jump-off point 
for a future offensive into the Caucasus. Under huge pressure, Fourth Panzer Army was 
able to hold the Rostov corridor open for long enough to allow the passage of First 
Panzer Army.49  The complete isolation of Seventeenth Army occurred on 6 February, 
when the port of Yeisk on the Sea of Azov was captured by the 276th Rifle Division of 58th 
Army.50   
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Chapter II: The Novorossiysk Landing Operations 
Although Soviet attempts for a second huge encirclement had been thwarted, the 
German position in the southern sector was still perilous, and the eyes of the Soviet 
command turned to the isolated Seventeenth Army. Plans for a Soviet amphibious 
landing in the Novorossiysk area had first been drawn up in November 1942, and at a 
Stavka meeting on 24 January 1943, a combined amphibious and ground operation to 
encircle the German Seventeenth Army was proposed. 51 On land, the Soviet 18th and 
46th Armies would seize the Kuban River crossings in the Krasnodar region and then push 
west towards the Taman Peninsula while the 47th Army would launch a direct attack on 
Novorossiysk. Meanwhile, the amphibious landing would place forces into the rear of 
the German defences and move to link up with 47th Army. The combined operation 
would encircle Seventeenth Army and prevent it from withdrawing into the defensible 
Kuban Bridgehead.52 At this meeting, the forces in the area were also reorganised. 
Transcaucasus Front’s Northern Group, under the command of General Ivan 
Maslennikov, was renamed North Caucasus Front,  and the remainder of Ivan Tyulenev’s 
Transcaucasus Front returned to its original role of guarding the southern frontiers with 
Iran and Turkey.53 
The location chosen for the landing operation was Yuzhnaya Ozereika, about thirty 
kilometres southwest of Novorossiysk, and the detailed plan was drawn up by Vice-
Admiral Filipp Sergeyevich Oktyabrskiy, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, and 
timed for 01:30 on 4 February.54 The timetable was as follows: 
00:45: A parachute force of eighty men would be dropped at Glebovka and Vasilevka, to 
the north of Yuzhnaya Ozereika, and bombing raids would be carried out on German 
defensive positions around the landing zones. 
01:00: A naval bombardment would be launched by a Black Sea Fleet fire-support 
squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Lev Anatolevich Vladimirskiy and comprising the 
cruisers Krasniy Kavkaz and Krasniy Krym, the destroyer leader Kharkov and the 
destroyers Besposhchadniy and Soobrazitelniy. 
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01:30: The main landing at Yuzhnaya Ozereika, commanded by Rear-Admiral Nikolai 
Yefremovich Basistiy, would be launched, along with a simultaneous diversionary 
landing at Stanichka in the southern suburbs of Novorossiysk. Dummy landing 
operations would also be feigned at a number of locations along the southern coast of 
the Taman Peninsula: Anapa, Blagoveschenskiy, the Sukko River Valley and Cape 
Zhelezniy Rog.55 
The main landing force comprised two echelons. The first was formed up in Gelendzhik 
and was made up of 255th Independent Red Banner Naval Infantry Brigade, 563rd 
Independent Tank Brigade and a separate machine-gun battalion. The second echelon 
formed up in Tuapse and comprised 83rd Independent Red Banner Naval Infantry 
Brigade, 165th Infantry Brigade and 29th Anti-tank Artillery Regiment.56 Both groupings 
underwent intensive training in landing operations throughout January.57 
Even during the earliest preparations for the operation, however, a number of officers 
expressed doubts over the selection of Yuzhnaya Ozereika as the site of the main 
landing, citing the unpredictable winter weather and sea conditions, the presence of 
numerous minefields in the area and the distance from the ultimate objective of 
Novorossiysk.58 
The operation ran into serious problems from the start. On 27 January, 47th Army began 
its offensive in the Verkhnebakanskaya and Krymskaya areas, but was unable to force a 
breakthrough at any point. Although the original plan stipulated that the landing 
operation would not begin until such a penetration had been achieved, the 
Transcaucasus Front command nevertheless gave the order for the landing to proceed, 
partly in the hope that it would divert German forces and help 47th Army to achieve its 
aim.59 
The first landing group was late setting out from Gelendzhik and made slower than 
expected progress in heavy seas, so Basistiy sent a request to Vladimirskiy on Krasniy 
Kavkaz and to Oktyabrskiy, requesting a 90-minute postponement. Without waiting for 
confirmation from Oktyabrskiy, Vladimirskiy ordered his ships to hold fire and Basistiy 
                                                          
55
 A. Chernyshev, ‘Noch utrachennikh vozmozhnostei’ in Morskoi Sbornik, no. 12 (2008), p. 67. 
56
 Ibid., p. 68. 
57
 Iosif Kirin, Chernomorsky Flot v bitve za Kavkaze (Moscow, 1958), p. 156. 
58
 Chernyshev, ‘Noch utrachennikh vozmozhnostei’, p. 70. 
59
 Ibid., pp 71-2. 
19 
 
postponed the arrival of the second landing wave until 04:40, but the commanders 
overseeing the airborne, air-support and dummy landing operations did not receive this 
information and acted according to their original orders.60  
 
Figure 4: The Novorossiysk Landing Operations
61
 
Oktyabrskiy, however, did not wish to delay the operation as doing so would deprive 
him of the cover of darkness. He ordered that the original plan should be adhered to, 
but this message did not reach Basistiy and Vladimirskiy until it was too late for them to 
revert to the original plan. Again, Oktyabrskiy did not communicate with the air-support, 
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parachute and dummy landing groups, so they remained oblivious to the unfolding 
chaos.62 
The bombing raids and bombardment of the dummy landing sites were launched in 
accordance with the original timetable, as was the parachute drop, but one of the 
transport planes was unable to locate the drop zone and returned to base, reducing the 
strength of the parachute force by over 25 percent before the operation started. This 
disconnect between the different parts of the operation alerted the defending German 
and Romanian forces, allowing them to ascertain that a landing operation was imminent 
and also its likely location.63 At 00:35, V Corps placed all its forces defending the 
southern coast of the Taman Peninsula on the highest alert.64 
At 02:30, the naval support ships began their 30-minute bombardment against the 
German and Romanian defences at Yuzhnaya Ozereika. The fire was poorly-directed, 
however, and although over 2,000 shells were fired, the gun emplacements and 
defensive positions were largely undamaged. At 03:00, the cruisers ceased firing and set 
course for port, although the destroyers continued firing. The landing craft of the first 
group approached the shore at around 03:30, but came under intense fire and suffered 
heavy losses. Many of the tanks in the first landing group were released too far from the 
shore so their engines flooded and they were immobilised in the surf. 65 
A group of 1,427 men, with 10 tanks, was able to reach the shore. They quickly captured 
Yuzhnaya Ozereika and set out for Glebovka, a few miles to the north, but without 
support, they could not maintain the advance.66 The bulk of the group, including the last 
two remaining tanks, was pushed back and isolated in an area about one kilometre west 
of Yuzhnaya Ozereika on the morning of 5 February.67 Over the next few days, small 
groups tried to force their way through to Stanichka, and about 150 succeeded. Another 
group of 25, along with 18 paratroopers and 27 partisans, reached the coast to the east 
of Yuzhnaya Ozereika and were picked up by a motor boat on the evening of 9 
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February.68  Another 542 men of the landing group were captured.69 On 6 February, 
Seventeenth Army reported that the landing force at Yuzhnaya Ozereika had essentially 
been destroyed, and the following day, reported that 300 enemy dead and 31 U.S.-built 
tanks lay on the beach.70 
The diversionary landing at Stanichka, in contrast, proceeded virtually exactly as planned. 
At 01:30, torpedo boats raised a smoke screen across the shore, and fire from support 
vessels and from batteries on the eastern coast of Tsemess Bay were much more 
successful in silencing German guns than had been the case at Yuzhnaya Ozereika. The 
first landing groups, under the command of Major Tsesar L. Kunikov, disembarked and 
were able to seize a beachhead. At 02:40, Kunikov signalled for the second and third 
echelons to be landed. The landing party seized several buildings on the southern edge 
of Stanichka and was able to hold the beachhead until it was further reinforced. The 
bridgehead quickly became known as “Malaya Zemlya” (The Small Land).71 
The success against the Yuzhnaya Ozereika landing appears to have led to a degree of 
complacency among the German command regarding the Stanichka operation. At 00:15 
on 6 February, General Ruoff sent a message of congratulations to all the commanding 
officers who had been involved in the defence against the two landings, and later in the 
day, V Corps’ war diary reported that the landing force at Stanichka was encircled and 
that its attempts to expand its beachhead would be defeated.72 A German offensive to 
throw the landing party back into the sea was planned, but was not scheduled to start 
until 7 February, when parts of 198th Infantry Division were due to arrive from Krasnodar 
to reinforce V Corps’ line in a number of locations around Novorossiysk.73 Ivan Y. Petrov, 
the commander of the Black Sea Group of North Caucasus Front, displayed no such 
hesitation and quickly decided to divert all of the forces that had been intended for the 
main landing to reinforce the success of the Stanichka diversion.74  
                                                          
68
 Chernyshev, ‘Noch utrachennikh vozmozhnostei’, p. 77. 
69
Ilya Viktorevich Kiselev, ‘Poteri Krasnoi armii i Chernomorskogo flota v desantnykh operatsiyakh 
1941-1945 gg.’ In Bylye Gody: Rossiyskiy istoricheskaya zhurnal, no. 22, (Dec. 2011), p. 41. 
70 Armeeoberkommando 17, Abteilung Ia: Kriegstagebuch Nr. 6, 1. Feb. – 30. Juni 1943 (BArch RH 
20-17/178), pp 16, 18. 
71
 Grechko, Battle for the Caucasus, pp 249-51. 
72
 Kriegstagebuch V. A.K., Heft 11 (BArch RH 24/5/53), pp 8-9. 
73
 Kriegstagebuch AOK 17 Ia, Nr. 6 (BArch RH 20-17/178), p. 10.  
74
 Carell, Scorched earth, p. 170. 
22 
 
Within a few days, over 17,000 men, twenty-one guns, seventy-four mortars, eighty-six 
machine guns and 440 tons of supplies had been landed on the beachhead. Kunikov was 
fatally wounded by a shell splinter on the night of 11–12 March and was posthumously 
awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.75 He is buried in Heroes’ Square, close to the 
waterfront in the centre of Novorossiysk. 
 
Figure 5: Tsesar Kunikov's Grave in Novorossiysk (Photograph by Author) 
The debacle at Yuzhnaya Ozereika has been largely overlooked in the Soviet history of 
the war, as attention focussed on the Malaya Zemlya landings. The official History of the 
Great Patriotic War describes the events at Yuzhnaya Ozereika in just two sentences 
while devoting several pages to the success of the auxiliary operation. 76  During this 
period, Leonid Brezhnev was serving as a political officer with 18th Army, and he made a 
number of trips by boat to Malaya Zemlya to encourage the troops. During his term as 
general secretary of the Communist Party (1964-82), the legend of Malaya Zemlya was 
taken to new heights. In 1973, Novorossiysk was awarded the title of Hero City, 
elevating it to the status of the likes of Stalingrad and Leningrad in terms of its 
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importance in the war. A series of massive memorial complexes were constructed, 
including one at the site of the Malaya Zemlya landings.77 
 
Figure 6: The Malaya Zemlya Memorial Complex in Novorossiysk (Photograph by Author) 
The question of what the Malaya Zemlya landing actually achieved, beyond its 
propaganda value and tying down German forces, is worthy of further consideration. 
Grechko claims that the operation created favourable conditions for the liberation of 
Novorossiysk, 78 but this view is difficult to support, as the city was not recaptured until a 
full seven months after the landing operation and after the Germans had already 
decided to withdraw the whole of Seventeenth Army from the Kuban Bridgehead. 
Several writers, including Tieke, note that the presence of the Soviet forces at Malaya 
Zemlya prevented the Germans from using the port facilities at Novorossiysk.79 This 
argument is also questionable. There were already significant Red Army forces on the 
high ground on the eastern side of Tsemess Bay, where the front line had been static 
since September 1942. These forces provided artillery support for the landing operation, 
so they would also have been able to threaten any German vessels attempting to enter 
or exit the port. In any case, the German-held ports and airfields farther to the rear were 
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sufficient for Seventeenth Army’s supply needs. During March, for example, the supply 
and evacuation totals by sea and air were as follows:80 
Withdrawals Air Sea 
Soldiers & Wounded 21,889 76,010 
Civilians 2,887 17,806 
Motor Vehicles  9,256 
Horse-drawn Vehicles  12,442 
Horses  48,624 
Field Kitchens  444 
Guns  253 
Supplies   
Fuel 2827 m
3*
 1880 m
3
 
Flour 2248 t 1554 t 
Rations 238 t 2318 t 
Animal feed/roughage 5341 t 5793 t 
Ammunition  262 t 3730 t 
*Note: 1 m
3
 = 1,000 litres 
To further supplement the supply system, a cable-car system across the Kerch Strait, 
with a capacity of 1,000 tons per day, went into operation in June.81   
A second question that warrants further examination is that of what could have been 
achieved if the main landing at Yuzhnaya Ozereika had unfolded as planned.  The landing 
forces at Malaya Zemlya were concentrated on a relatively narrow peninsula, so the 
opposing German defensive line remained quite short. Nevertheless, the quickly 
reinforced Soviet force put severe pressure on the German defences and created 
concern at Seventeenth Army headquarters. On 7 February, the army’s war diary 
reported that it had been fully pushed onto the defensive by the reinforced enemy, and 
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on 21 February, it stated that the decrease in the combat strength of its forces in the 
Novorossiysk area was “particularly serious.” 82 
The defences along the coast around Yuzhnaya Ozereika were weaker than at Stanichka, 
and the fact that the small landing party was able to force its way inland as far as 
Glebovka suggests that if it had been reinforced to a level approaching that at Stanichka, 
it could have represented a serious threat to the entire left wing of Seventeenth Army’s 
defensive line. Ultimately, the failures of the Yuzhnaya Ozereika landing and 47th Army’s 
offensive in the centre of Seventeenth Army’s line allowed the latter to hold a 
continuous defensive line through the spring and summer.   
 
Figure 7: Leonid Brezhnev (seated, right) with a Group of Political Officers at Malaya Zemlya, 1943
83
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Chapter III: Operation Neptune & Soviet Summer Offensives 
In late February and early March, poor weather prevented any significant operations 
and movements by either side.84 Towards the end of March, the northern flank of 
Seventeenth Army was pulled back slightly to improve its positions in the marshy region 
along the coast of the Azov Sea.85 Around this time, Army Group A and Seventeenth 
Army finalised plans for Operation Neptune, an offensive aimed at destroying the Soviet 
forces in the Malaya Zemlya beachhead and retaking the area.86 The offensive was 
originally planned for 6 April, although this date was not definitively finalised, as clear 
weather was required to ensure that strong Luftwaffe forces could be used for close 
support of the attacking troops, suppression of enemy artillery batteries on the coast 
road between Novorossiysk and Kabardinka on the eastern shore of Tsemess Bay and 
prevention of reinforcement and supply of the beachhead by sea.87 Aircraft were 
transferred from the Donbass and southern Ukraine to reinforce Luftflotte 4’s forces for 
this effort.88 
The attacking forces would include: 89 
 4th Mountain Division: 5 battalions, with 2 mountain artillery battalions, 
strengthened by additional artillery and army combat engineers. 
 125th Infantry Division: all available forces, including reinforcement by one 
assault gun battalion and parts of another from army troops. The force was split 
into two groups, a northern group with 2 battalions and a southern group with 3 
battalions. 
 73rd Infantry Division: a specially-formed attack group and all artillery. 
In order to achieve maximum surprise, the concentration of 4th Mountain Division and 
the regrouping of 125th and 73rd Infantry Divisions were to take place at night and in 
small groups, to be completed by 18:00 on 5 April. Additional deception measures 
                                                          
84
 Kriegstagebuch AOK 17 Ia, Nr. 6 (BArch RH 20-17/178), pp 87, 92. 
85
 Tieke, The Caucasus and the oil, p. 341. 
86
 Kriegstagebuch AOK 17 Ia, Nr. 6 (BArch RH 20-17/178), p. 138. 
87 ‘Korpsbefehl für die Versammlung und Bereitstellung des V. A.K. zum Angriff “Neptun“’, Gen. 
Kdo. V. A.K. Abt Ia Nr. 131/43 g Kdos.‘ in Operationsakten 14. März – 25. Juni (BArch RH 20-
17/181), fol. 71. 
88
 V. Nikiforov, ‘Sovetskaya aviatsiya v bitve za Kavkaz’ in Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, no. 8 
(1971), p. 16. 
89
 ‘Anlage zu Gruppe Wetzel, Ia Nr. 134/43 g. Kdo 31.3.1943.‘ in Operationsakten 14. März – 25. 
Juni (BArch RH 20-17/181), fol. 71. 
27 
 
included strict traffic control and radio silence, the dissemination of false rumours about 
an imminent withdrawal from Novorossiysk and unchanged reconnaissance, combat 
patrol and artillery activity. The attack was to be launched without a preliminary artillery 
barrage, and if individual assault groups required artillery support, this would only be 
launched at the jump-off time.90 
The attack was divided into two phases. In the first phase, 4th Mountain Division and 
125th Infantry Division would advance from their concentration areas around Fedotovka 
and Poklaba Farm, respectively, towards the Myskhako – Stegneyeva Farm road, with 4th 
Mountain Division taking Myskhako Berg and Myskhako village and 125th Infantry 
Division clearing the Myskhako Valley and a wooded area to the north of the village. In 
this first phase, 73rd Infantry Division's artillery would provide support for the left wing 
of 125th Infantry Division. Once the first phase had crossed a loop on the Myskhako – 
Stegneyeva Farm road, 73rd Infantry Division would join in the second phase by attacking 
south into Stanichka. It was envisaged that the attack would reach so far into the 
beachhead that the enemy forces would be split into many individual groups that could 
be destroyed piecemeal.91 In particular, the army commander General Ruoff stressed 
the importance of penetrating as far as possible into the beachhead on the first day to 
prevent the evacuation or reinforcement of the enemy by sea, although he expressly 
forbade the setting of specific daily goals.92 
On 1 April, radio intercepts and ground reconnaissance suggested that the Soviets would 
launch an attack against the east wing of XXXXIV Corps, perhaps as early as the following 
day. The army’s war diary acknowledges that this could make the situation 
“uncomfortable,” but concludes that it was not a reason for specific concern.93 The 
intended start date of 6 April was postponed due to poor weather, as was the first 
rescheduled date of 10 April.94  
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Figure 8: Operation Neptune 
The offensive was eventually launched at 06:30 on 17 April, after a final one-hour delay 
caused by heavy fog that prevented air activity.95 The 4th Mountain Division's attack 
initially broke through the forward positions to the slopes of Myskhako Berg and Teufels 
Berg, about 1.5 kilometres to the east, but was then held up by strong enemy 
resistance.96 The attack by the northern group of 125th Infantry Division was initially 
focussed on the Myskhako Valley and high ground to the north and northwest of 
Myskhako village, and a penetration of about one kilometre was forced. Its left wing 
broke through the forward positions southwest of the road loop and became involved in 
heavy fighting in an area around one kilometre west and southeast of Stegneyeva 
Farm.97 
Despite the importance of suppressing the enemy artillery on the eastern shore of 
Tsemess Bay, fire from this area resumed in the early afternoon, aimed primarily at the 
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northern wing of 125th Infantry Division. Combat reports confirmed that the enemy had 
moved significant forces into the front line in anticipation of the attack, and the heavy 
fighting for strongly-fortified positions caused considerable losses among the attacking 
infantry.98 
 
Figure 9: Romanian Artillery Observers Using a Knocked-out T-34 as Shelter
99
 
In the afternoon, in a discussion among Generals Ruoff, Wetzel (V Corps) and Korten 
(Luftflotte 4), the possibility of transferring parts of 73rd Infantry Division to 125th 
Infantry Division to boost the latter's strength at the key breakthrough positions was 
discussed. This proposal was ultimately rejected because of the time that the regrouping 
would take and because it was considered that the most favourable force ratios were in 
73rd Infantry Division's sector, as the Soviets had moved significant forces from the 
southern parts of Novorossiysk to the Myskhako – Stegneyeva area.100 
During the night of 17 – 18 April, a Soviet convoy that approached the beachhead was 
brought under artillery fire, and two vessels were reported to have been set on fire.101 
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The offensive was renewed at 05:30 on 18 April after harassing fire by all available 
artillery, but again quickly became bogged down by the tenacious Soviet defence and 
the difficult terrain and did not achieve a decisive early penetration at any point.102 
During the night, the Soviets had moved up the 83rd Marine Infantry Brigade, one of the 
units that had originally participated in the Malaya Zemlya landing, from the rear to 
reinforce the defences in the Myskhako Valley.103  
 
Figure 10: Soviet Marines in the Malaya Zemlya Beachhead, Spring 1943
104
 
During the course of the morning, however, 125th Infantry Division succeeded in 
breaking through in an area to the southeast of Poklaba Farm and taking the north-
eastern slope of a small hill about one kilometre north of Myskhako village. The attacks 
by 73rd Infantry Division and 4th Mountain Division, which had not achieved any 
significant results in the face of the strong Soviet resistance, were halted to allow 
additional forces to be thrown against the schwerpunkt north of Myskhako.105 One 
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regiment was transferred from 6th Romanian Cavalry Division, two regiments from 4th 
Mountain Division and two battalions, along with mortar and assault gun units, from 
73rd Infantry Division.106 
In spite of poor weather, the first Soviet counter-attacks were launched early on the 
morning of 19 April, in the area of the road loop, preceded by heavy artillery and mortar 
fire, and through the day further localised counter-thrusts were launched.107 On the 
German side, the bad weather delayed the redeployment of troops to 125th Infantry 
Division, but at 11:20 it launched an attack aimed at linking up with a group that had 
already reached the slopes of Teufels Berg.108 After seven hours of bitter fighting, the 
linkup was finally achieved, but the united assault groups were almost immediately put 
on the defensive by Soviet counter-attacks from the south and east, supported by 
artillery fire of an unprecedented intensity.109  
After defending against numerous local Soviet counterattacks through the night of 19 – 
20 April, 125th Infantry Division launched another attempt to take the high ground at 
10:30, but this was stopped by further fortified Soviet defensive positions after gains of 
just a few hundred metres.110  Later in the day, General Jaenecke visited the 
headquarters of both V Corps and 125th Infantry Division. A review of the operation so 
far revealed that the air and artillery support had not been able to eliminate the Soviet 
defensive systems, resulting in high casualties among the attacking German infantry. 
Although 125th Division was urgently calling for new reserves, an expected Soviet attack 
on XXXXIV Corps’ sector meant that no forces could be pulled from here to support 125th 
Division’s attack. It was agreed to postpone further attacks until 22 April, so that new 
reserves could be created by a regrouping of forces.111 
On 21 April, there were numerous discussions between army and corps commands 
about the possibility of resuming the attack. The lack of available infantry forces was a 
                                                          
106
 ‘Tagesmeldung 18.4.1943, 20:50‘ in Meldungen der Korps, 21. März – 10. Mai (BArch RH 20-
17/184). 
107
 ‘Morgenmeldung 19.4.1943, 06:40‘ in Meldungen der Korps, 21. März – 10. Mai (BArch RH 20-
17/184). 
108
 ‘Zwischenmeldung 19.4.1943, 15:00‘ in Meldungen der Korps, 21. März – 10. Mai (BArch RH 
20-17/184). 
109
 ‘Tagesmeldung 19.4.1943, 21:00‘ in Meldungen der Korps, 21. März – 10. Mai (BArch RH 20-
17/184). 
110
 Kriegstagebuch AOK 17 Ia, Nr. 6 (BArch RH 20-17/178), p. 186. 
111
 Ibid., p. 185. 
32 
 
constant theme, with losses since the start of the offensive being estimated at 2,741 
men. The Chief of the Army General Staff, General Kurt Zeitzler, requested reports from 
125th Infantry and 4th Mountain Divisions in order to present them to Hitler that evening. 
These reports again maintained that a continuation of the attack would only be possible 
if fresh forces were made available. Another report to Army Group A noted the declining 
quality of the divisions as a consequence of the shortage of NCOs and a complete lack of 
any opportunities for training since early 1942.112 Another increasing problem for the 
German command was the situation in the air. In the first few days of the offensive, the 
Luftwaffe had largely enjoyed air superiority, 113 but by 21 April, aircraft from three 
newly arriving Soviet air corps were committed, shifting the balance towards the 
defenders.114      
On 22 April, V Corps submitted a situation report that concluded that it did not have 
sufficient forces to continue a concentrated attack against the beachhead, citing the loss 
of surprise, strengthening enemy air activity and the continuous resupply and 
reinforcement of the defenders by sea, as well as the lack of its own forces. The total 
strength of the attacking group was just 13,541 men, out of a combat strength of the 
whole army of 57,590.115 Following a visit by Field Marshal von Kleist, the commander-
in-chief of Army Group A on 23 April,116 Operation Neptune was finally called off two 
days later.117 
Even accounting for the benefit of hindsight, it appears clear that Operation Neptune 
was doomed to failure from the outset. The relatively small, worn-out and poorly-
trained assault groups faced a numerically superior defending force that had 
significantly strengthened its positions in the difficult terrain and was able to continually 
resupply itself by sea. The increasing Soviet air strength over the area increased the 
pressure on the attacking Germans infantry, both directly and by allowing the Soviet 
artillery in the beachhead and on the opposite side of Tsemess Bay to play an increasing 
role. The war diaries of Seventeenth Army and V Corps around this time make an 
                                                          
112
 Ibid., pp 187-9. 
113
 Ibid., pp 177, 184. 
114
 Grechko, Battle for the Caucasus, p. 292. 
115
 Kriegstagebuch AOK 17 Ia, Nr. 6 (BArch RH 20-17/178), p. 190. The ration strength of the 
whole army was 178,912. 
116
 Ibid., p. 191. 
117
 Tieke, The Caucasus and the oil, p. 339. 
33 
 
uncharacteristically high number of references to the weakened state of their forces. 
The growing disconnect between the plans of the German High Command and the 
forces in the field is graphically illustrated by an entry in Seventeenth Army’s diary for 21 
April. It records, perhaps with a hint of sarcasm, a visit by General of Railway Troops 
Otto Will, who reported on the “grand” plans for the construction of road and railway 
bridges across the Kerch Strait, with a planned completion date of the railway bridge of 
1 August 1944.118  
 
Figure 11: German Infantry in Novorossiysk
119
 
The pulling back of Seventeenth Army’s northern flank, noted at the start of this chapter, 
meant that this sector was protected by impassable reed beds along the coast and by 
rivers and marshes further inland. The heavily-forested mountains of the southern 
sector also offered easily defensible positions, as the assault groups of Operation 
Neptune had found to their cost. Only the central sector, around the town of Krymskaya, 
offered any realistic possibilities for large-scale operations. The town was also an 
important communications centre, with roads and railways to Novorossiysk, Anapa, 
Taman and Temryuk passing through it.120 This area therefore became the key to the 
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entire German defence and the focus of Soviet attacks through the spring and summer 
months. 121 
The first offensive was launched in early April. The plan called for 56th Army to break 
through on either side of the Krasnodar – Krymskaya railroad to encircle the town, while 
37th Army pushed through the German defences and moved west.  The attack began at 
08:00 on 4 April, and 55th Guards Rifle Division and 383rd and 61st Rifle Divisions quickly 
forced a penetration between 97th Jäger Division and 9th Infantry Division that was 
expanded to a width of 1.5 kilometres by the afternoon, before a counter-attack by 
assault groups formed by 97th Jäger Division, with support from an assault gun battery, 
restored the original front line.122 
To the defenders’ surprise, the assault was not strongly renewed on the following day, 
although some fighting continued until 6 April. Heavy rain had severely hampered the 
movement of Soviet supplies and reinforcements, and an almost ten-day pause for 
refitting and reinforcement was required.123 After heavy air raids on Krymskaya on the 
night of 13 – 14 April, the second attack was launched at 05:00. The three attack wedges 
again forced an early breakthrough, reaching the southern edge of Krymskaya by noon. 
The German counter-attack in the afternoon held up the advance, but could not seal off 
the penetrations.  Overnight, reserves were moved from other sections of the front, and 
on 15 April, the fighting ebbed and flowed, with a height known by the Germans as Hill 
68.8 and a nearby dairy being the focal points. More German reinforcements were 
moved up on the following night, and by the evening of 16 April, the front line had been 
stabilised, although the Germans had been pushed back slightly in the area to the south 
of Krymskaya.124 Another pause in the fighting occurred, during which a high-powered 
delegation arrived from Moscow to oversee the next effort. It included Marshal Georgiy 
Zhukov, Air Force commander General Aleksandr A. Novikov, Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov 
of Navy command and Stavka representative Sergei Shtemenko.125 
The 56th Army renewed its attack on 29 April, initially against the northern wing of 97th 
Jäger Division’s sector. This achieved little, and the focus of the attack was switched to 
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the south of Krymskaya. By the evening of 3 May the spearheads, including 20 tanks, 
had reached the Krymskaya – Neberdzhaevskaya road, threatening to encircle 
Krymskaya from the south. That night, the Germans abandoned Krymskaya and pulled 
back to the D-Line, a deeply-echeloned defensive system a few miles to the west of the 
town.126 The Soviets were unable to make any further progress, and the fighting died 
down again over the next few weeks as both sides regrouped and reorganised.  Zhukov’s 
party returned to Moscow on 17 May, with Shtemenko noting that they were in low 
spirits and preparing for a rebuke from Stalin for their failure to achieve a decisive 
success. Ultimately, however, it was Maslennikov who paid the price, being replaced as 
commander of North Caucasus Front by Ivan Petrov.127 
The next attack plan called for 56th and 9th Armies to break through the German 
defences in the Kievskoe – Moldavanskoe area, to the northwest of Krymskaya, after 
which 18th Army’s forces at Malaya Zemlya would break out of the beachhead to 
outflank Novorossiysk.128 The attack opened with an artillery barrage and airstrike at 
05:00 on 26 May, and after six hours the leading tank units had made advances of three 
to five kilometres, but were forced to withdraw by German counter-attacks and a lack of 
infantry support.129 Over the next few days, the focus of the fighting was Hill 121.4, 
approximately midway between Kievskoe and Moldavanskoe. It changed hands several 
times, but was taken for good by the Soviets on 29 May and held against several 
German counter-attacks. The intensity of the fighting subsided in the first days of June. 
The Soviets had taken a small patch of territory, but had failed to breach the German 
defences.130 
June and early July were relatively quiet, as both sides improved their positions and 
refitted their troops and also as a likely consequence of the focus of both sides on the 
upcoming Battle of Kursk.131  On 7 June, Seventeenth Army received a new commander, 
when General Erwin Jaenecke arrived to replace Ruoff.132 It also received some much-
needed reinforcement when 98th Infantry Division was transported from Bryansk, about 
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200 miles south-west of Moscow, to the Crimea at the start of June, from where it was 
shipped across the Kerch Strait from 15 – 26 June and inserted into the sector that had 
been occupied by 101st Jäger Division.133  
 
Figure 12: Frontline, May-September 1943
134
 
On 15 July, prisoner interrogations and observations of Soviet activity, such as mine 
clearance, reconnaissance patrols and traffic movements, suggested that an attack 
against XXXXIV Corps in the hills around Moldavanskoe and Krymskaya was imminent. 135 
Both sides fully understood that this sector was the key to the German defence of the 
whole Taman Peninsula.136 The expected attack was launched at 04:00 the following 
morning and was concentrated against 97th Jäger Division and a hill known by the 
Germans as Hill 114.1. After a heavy artillery bombardment, the attack was launched 
with at least two rifle brigades, parts of two rifle divisions and one tank brigade, with 
significant air and artillery support.137 Two penetrations of the German defensive line 
were initially made, on both sides of the main Krymskaya – Moldavanskoe road. The 
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northern penetration was thrown back by a counter-attack in the afternoon, but the 
southern breakthrough area was only partially regained, despite counter-attack efforts 
during the night and on the following day.138 Further attacks by both sides over the next 
few days achieved little and sustained heavy losses.139 Soviet reinforcements were 
brought forward for a renewed offensive that was launched at 05:30 on 22 July. On the 
following day, a breach was briefly forced between 97th Jäger Division and 98th Infantry 
Division, but an assault group formed by the latter counter-attacked and restored the 
connection. Further Soviet attacks in the last days of July and into August failed to 
achieve any significant breakthroughs.140 
On 24 July, as the fighting around Krymskaya was at its peak, the Soviets launched a 
separate attack against V Corps in the Neberdzhaevskaya area to the southwest, with 
the aim of breaking through to Novorossiysk. This effort continued until 10 August, 
without success.141 In the second half of August, the intensity of the fighting in all 
sectors subsided considerably, and by mid-September, the Soviets had suspended all 
major offensive operations and were taking up positions to threaten the imminent 
German withdrawal.142 This was finally authorised by Hitler on 8 September.143  
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Chapter IV: The Evacuation of the Kuban Bridgehead 
Seventeenth Army’s command had in fact been preparing for the withdrawal for some 
time and  issued the order to begin Operation Kriemhild, the withdrawal of all German 
and Romanian forces from the Kuban Bridgehead to the Kerch Peninsula on the eastern 
tip of the Crimea, at 12:00 on 4 September.144  The operation was to be carried out in 
three phases. First, an outer defensive line called the Large Gothic Position would be 
held. Next, the withdrawal to a second line, the Small Gothic Position, would be 
conducted through a series of intermediate positions, with the shortening of the line 
allowing divisions to be removed from the line in sequence and sent back to harbours in 
the western part of the Taman Peninsula. Finally, the remaining divisions would pull 
back through a second set of intermediate positions to the north-western tip of the 
Taman Peninsula, from where they would be ferried across the narrow Kerch Strait to 
the Crimea. Two alternate plans for the withdrawal had been drawn up: Kriemhild, 
which envisaged the withdrawal of all of the army’s manpower and equipment, as well 
as everything of economic or military value, including most of the civilian population, 
over a 10 – 12-week period; and Brunhild, which proposed a 6 – 7-week plan in which 
the army and its equipment would be withdrawn, but infrastructure and goods would be 
destroyed.145  Once the order to initiate Kriemhild was issued, a decision to switch to 
Brunhild would be decided mainly by the activity of the Soviet forces in this and other 
sectors of the front.146 
A number of measures were taken to facilitate the smooth transport of men, supplies 
and equipment during the operation: a “Forwarding Staff East” was set up in 
Starotitarovskaya to control the transport to the harbours and airfields on the Taman 
side of the Kerch Straits; a corresponding “Forwarding Staff West” was established in 
Kerch to oversee the onward transport of evacuated units, supplies and equipment; and 
a Roads Command section was set up in XXXXIX Mountain Corps to implement traffic 
control.147 
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The first division to be withdrawn was 125th Infantry, which was transported by sea to 
Kerch and by air from Gostagaevskaya on 8 – 9 September.148 It and several of the other 
divisions that were withdrawn in the early part of the operation were transferred to 
Sixth Army (a new army that was formed after the loss of the original at Stalingrad), 
which was attempting to hold back the advance of 4th Ukrainian Front along the 
northern coast of the Azov Sea.149 This advance would isolate the German forces in the 
Crimea when it swept beyond the Perekop Isthmus, the narrow bridge linking the 
peninsula to the mainland. Mindful of the supply complications that this would create, 
Seventeenth Army issued an order on 22 September encouraging soldiers to conserve 
ammunition whenever possible.150     
On 8 September, the order to go over from Operation Kriemhild to Operation Brunhild 
was issued.151 The withdrawal from the Large Gothic Position would begin on 20 
September (X-Day) at the earliest, with the precise timing to be communicated by the 
army at least 3½ days before the jump-off.  Ultimately, this date was brought forward to 
15 September, by order of the commander of Army Group A, Field Marshal Ewald von 
Kleist.152  Each of the intermediate defensive positions was intended to be held for a 
maximum of three days, but the Small Gothic Position was to be prepared so that it 
could be defended for about three weeks. 
The shortening of the defensive line would allow for the withdrawal of significant 
forces153:  
 V Corps: 9th and 73rd Infantry Divisions, 1st and 4th Romanian Mountain Divisions, 
with 19th Romanian Infantry Division being transferred to XXXXIX Mountain 
Corps  
 XXXXIV Corps: 79th Infantry Division and 10th Romanian Infantry Division 
 XXXXIX Mountain Corps: 101 Jäger Division, possibly before X-Day.  
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Each withdrawing division was assigned a specific march route and timetable:154 
Division Assembly Area March Route Arrival 
First Units Final Units 
10th Romanian 
Infantry 
Iliych Dsghiginskoe – 
Starotitarovskaya – 
Vyshesteblievskaya 
22 
Sept. 
26 
Sept. 
1st Romanian 
Mountain 
Taman Westtrakt* 25 
Sept. 
27 
Sept. 
4th Romanian 
Mountain 
Taman Westtrakt* 27 
Sept. 
28 
Sept. 
9th Infantry Iliych Mittelweg* 27 
Sept. 
28 
Sept. 
79th Infantry Iliych Schilfweg* 30 
Sept. 
1 Oct. 
73rd Infantry Taman Westtrakt* 30 
Sept. 
1 Oct. 
9th Romanian 
Cavalry 
Taman Mittelweg* 30 
Sept. 
1 Oct. 
*: Westtrakt, Mittelweg and Schilfweg were three routes through the swampy region 
between the Kuban River and Kiziltashskiy Liman. 
 
This would leave XXXXIX Mountain Corps to defend the Small Gothic Position with the 
following divisions: 4th Mountain, 50th Infantry, 97th Jäger, 98th Infantry, 370th Infantry, 
and 19th Romanian Infantry. 
On the night of 9 – 10 September, the Soviet 18th Army launched another landing 
operation at Novorossiysk. This time, they feigned a landing at Yuzhnaya Ozereika but 
launched the actual attack in the northern and western parts of Novorossiysk 
harbour.155 Several beachheads were taken and were reinforced over the following two 
nights, allowing the group at the northern part of the harbour to break through the 
positions of the Romanian 20th Mountain Battalion on the coast road and link up with 
47th Army.156 Contrary to the Germans command’s expectations, however, further 
reinforcements were not landed, and V Corps was able to pull out of the city in good 
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order on the night of 15 – 16 September, having destroyed much of the port 
infrastructure.157 
At 19:00 on 15 September, the withdrawal from the Large to the Small Gothic Position 
began, with elements of V Corps pulling back to the Siegfried Checkpoint and XXXXIV 
Corps to the Völker Checkpoint,158 and on 17 September, the 10th Romanian Infantry 
Division and parts of the 1st Romanian Mountain Division (V Corps) were detached from 
the line and began their march back to the embarkation area at Taman. Both of these 
divisions had been completely transferred to the Crimea by 23 September.159 Meanwhile 
the XXXXIV Corps began moving back from the short Gernot Checkpoint into the 
Siegfried Checkpoint, forced back a day ahead of schedule by a Soviet attack against the 
centre of its positions.160  
 
Figure 13: Intermediate Positions during Seventeenth Army’s Withdrawal
161
 
On 18 September, the withdrawal of XXXXIV Corps to the Siegfried Checkpoint was 
proceeding as planned, and the disengagement of divisions was accelerated when the 
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order to remove 9th Infantry Division and 1st & 4th Romanian Mountain Divisions (all V 
Corps) from the line was issued. At 21:00, XXXXIX Mountain Corps began its movement 
to the Harz Checkpoint and V Corps began pulling back into to the Völker Checkpoint.162 
On 20 September, the withdrawal of V Corps and XXXXIV Corps into the Hagen 
Checkpoint and XXXXIX Mountain Corps into the Rhone Checkpoint began163. The move 
from the Völker to the Hagen Checkpoint meant that the harbour at Anapa was 
abandoned, and early on the morning of 21 September, a landing party of Soviet 
marines and parts of 5th Guards Tank Brigade took possession of the shattered town.164 
In an effort to disrupt the withdrawal operations on both flanks, the Soviets launched 
two landing operations on the night of 24 – 25 September.165 On the Azov coast, a 
landing force made up of units from 389th Rifle Division and 369th Naval Infantry 
Battalion166 was put ashore between the Kuban River Estuary and Golubitskaya, but was 
wiped out by noon, with 187 of 200 of the marines who landed being killed.167 On the 
German right wing, elements of 55th Guards Infantry Division, 143rd Naval Infantry 
Battalion and 83rd Naval Infantry Brigade were landed in the vicinity of Lake Solenoye to 
the west of Blagoveshchenskaya. The defending Romanian 9th Cavalry Division was 
unable to eliminate this beachhead, but was able to seal it off and prevent it from 
expanding its position. The Romanians began their planned withdrawal from the Small 
Gothic position during the night of 25 – 26 September, and had been fully withdrawn 
over the Kerch Strait by 28 September.168 
The army’s general staff section was flown out to Mariental in the Crimea on 26 
September, with XXXXIX Mountain Corps taking over command of all the forces 
remaining in the Small Gothic Position and V Corps assuming responsibility for the 
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defence of the Kerch Peninsula.169 At this point, Seventeenth Army’s force remaining in 
the Kuban bridgehead amounted to:170 
 65,000 men 
 800 motorcycles 
 1,100 cars 
 2,000 trucks 
 600 tracked vehicles 
 600 trailers 
 5,400 horse-drawn vehicles 
 15,000 horses 
 900 guns of all calibres 
 
The beginning of the movement to the Vienna Position would leave no doubt that a full 
withdrawal from the Kuban was underway, so the time leading up to the start of this 
part of the operation was particularly tense, as the German commanders waited to see 
if the Soviets would launch a serious attack.171 During the night of 30 September – 1 
October, an attack against the junction of 97th Jäger Division and 98th Infantry Division 
was repulsed with heavy enemy casualties.172  
At 20:00 on 1 October, the first withdrawal out of the Small Gothic Position began, with 
98th Infantry Division and 97th Jäger Division moving back towards the Vienna Position, 
and on 3 October, the withdrawal of 19th Romanian Infantry Division from the right flank 
of the Small Gothic Position into the Bucharest position followed.173 This gave up the last 
remaining major harbour at Taman. The 19th Infantry was the last Romanian division to 
be withdrawn. It reached its embarkation point on the morning of 3 October and had 
been completely transferred to the Crimea by the afternoon of 5 October.174  
At 20:00 on 4 October, the withdrawal from the Bucharest and Vienna Positions to the 
Berlin Position began, unhindered by the Soviets, and by 6 October, the whole of 370th 
Infantry Division had reached this position. The bulk of the division continued through 
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the Munich Position and on to the coast for evacuation, thus leaving 97th Jäger Division 
holding the Munich position.175 
Kriegsmarine forces in the Black Sea, under the command of Vice-Admiral Gustav 
Kieseritzky, had a number of tasks during the final stages of the withdrawal operation. 
These included securing the Kerch Strait and the Taman Peninsula coast along both 
flanks of the withdrawing army, providing smokescreen cover, bombarding enemy 
positions on the Taman peninsula, providing cargo space as part of the withdrawal 
operation, preparing the withdrawal of the last units and laying mines to protect the 
crossing transports from attack by the Soviet Black Sea Fleet.176   
The plan for the final transport was issued by the Kerch Straits Command on 6 
October.177 This order listed the last units to be withdrawn on as 97th Jäger Division and 
parts of 4th Mountain Division and 370th Infantry Division, along with the final elements 
of the Seventeenth Army troops, supporting flak troops and the garrison on Kosa Tuzla 
island. The specified embarkation points were Iliych, both sides of Maliy Kut and the 
south side of Kosa Tuzla. Most of the transports were to sail to Cape Yenikale and 
Zhukovka, to the east of Kerch, with some docking at Kerch Harbour’s south mole and 
fishing port and at Cape Ak Burun and Kamysh Burun Bay, to the south of the harbour. 
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Figure 14: Kerch Harbour (Photograph by Author) 
Early on the morning of the 6 October, the Soviets landed about two companies from 
83rd Marine Infantry Brigade on Kosa Tuzla, potentially representing a threat to the 
withdrawing transports and providing a springboard for a larger operation against the 
Crimea. The landing was reinforced the following afternoon, under the cover of a heavy 
fog.178 
On the night of 7 – 8 October, the withdrawal from the Munich to the Breslau Position 
began, with the final rearguards withdrawing at 03:00, undetected by the enemy, who 
brought the positions in the Munich position under heavy artillery fire until 05:00. 179 
The Breslau Position split the remaining units in two, with Dinskoy Bay separating 13th 
Mountain Jäger Regiment, which would be transported from Maliy Kut on the southern 
side of the bay, from the remaining forces, which would board their transports at Iliych 
and the Kosa Chushka Spit. The final defensive lines, the Ulm and Stuttgart Positions, 
covered the landing stages at Iliych and Kosa Chushka, respectively.  
During the day, the necessary transports were assembled at the three embarkation 
points, and loading began at 17:00. All the vehicles and artillery were successfully loaded 
after about 1½ hours, with the troops following. By 22:30, the last boats were pulling 
away from the shore, and the fifteen landing stages that had been constructed at Iliych 
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were blown up after the last boat pulled away.180 At around the same time, the 
evacuation of Kosa Tuzla began, unhindered by the Soviet troops that remained on the 
island.181  
At 00:10 on 9 October, the commander-in-chief of the Kerch Strait, Generalleutnant 
Walther Lucht, reported that all boats had left from Iliych, Kosa Chushka and Maliy Kut, 
and by 02:00, the last of these boats had reached the mainland. The final boat from Kosa 
Tuzla reached Cape Ak Burun at 04:00.182 At 07:30 that morning, Seventeenth Army’s 
Chief of General Staff, Generalmajor Wolfdietrich Ritter von Xylander, transmitted a 
lengthy communiqué reviewing the campaign in the Kuban, including the defensive 
battles, the withdrawal and cooperation among the army, Luftwaffe and navy.183 Stalin’s 
order of the day commended all of the Soviet troops who took part in the battles on the 
Taman Peninsula, and the liberation was marked in Moscow that evening by an artillery 
salute of 20 salvoes from 224 guns.184 
The respite for the soldiers of Seventeenth Army who were evacuated to the Crimea 
proved to be brief. As stated earlier, some divisions were transferred to Sixth Army, 
which was attempting in vain to halt the Soviet advance in southern Ukraine. Those that 
remained in the Crimea became isolated for a second time within a few weeks of their 
arrival, when the Soviets captured Perekop and sealed off the land corridor to the 
peninsula on 3 November.  In early November, North Caucasus Front launched a landing 
operation at Kerch and Eltigen, a few miles to the south. An earlier operation here, in 
December 1941, had been a disaster, but this time, units of 18th and 56th Armies seized a 
beachhead and held it through the winter.185 
The offensive to recapture the Crimea was launched by 4th Ukrainian Front from Perekop 
and the forces in the Kerch Peninsula on 8 April 1944, and Seventeenth Army was 
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quickly pushed back into Sevastopol.186 The final assault on the city was launched on 5 
May and it was recaptured on 9 May. A second evacuation by sea, to the Romanian 
Black Sea ports, was less successful than the Kuban operation. Rather than the short hop 
over the Kerch Strait, this operation involved a voyage of over 200 miles. Soviet bombers 
sank a significant number of ships, including the Teja and Totila, which were destroyed 
on 10 May with losses estimated as high as 10,000.187 Fewer than 40,000 of Seventeenth 
Army’s force of 150,000 in the Crimea were safely evacuated.188  
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Chapter V: Conclusions 
The failure of the landing operation at Yuzhnaya Ozereika and the simultaneous attack 
by 47th Army to the northeast of Novorossiysk denied the Soviets the possibility of 
quickly clearing the German and Romanian forces from the Kuban region. Seventeenth 
Army’s subsequent defence of the Kuban bridgehead can be compared in some respects 
with a similar campaign that occurred at the opposite end of the Eastern Front between 
the autumn of 1944 and the end of the war. In early August 1944, the Soviet advance in 
the Baltic region cut the link between the German Army Group North and the rest of the 
front.189 When the Soviet 51st Army reached Lithuanian port of Palanga on the Baltic 
coast on 10 October, the German Sixteenth and Eighteenth Armies were completely 
isolated in the Kurland Peninsula. Of the thirty-three divisions that were originally 
encircled, twelve were gradually evacuated by sea, leaving twenty-one that were 
renamed as Army Group Kurland and eventually surrendered at the end of the war after 
successfully defending against six major Soviet attacks.190 
As with the Kuban, Hitler refused to countenance any withdrawal from Kurland, and a 
number of increasingly heated arguments with Heinz Guderian over the matter were a 
factor in Guderian’s dismissal as Chief of Staff of the Army on 28 March 1945.191 The 
reasons given for retaining the forces on the Baltic coast had been to secure the 
withdrawal of German forces from Norway and Finland after the Finns agreed an 
armistice with the Soviets in September 1944, to protect the shipments of Swedish and 
Norwegian ore and minerals that were so vital to the German war industries and to 
enable the evacuation of as many German civilians as possible from East Prussia.192 The 
bulk of the German forces in Norway and Finland remained in place until the end of the 
war,193 and the Swedish government halted all trade with Germany at the end of 
1944.194 The evacuation of civilians under the codename Operation Hannibal, however, 
continued until the very last days of the war, as an array of merchant and naval vessels, 
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under the command of Generaladmiral Oskar Kummetz transported over two million 
people from ports along the Baltic coast to the German heartland.195    
 
Figure 15: The Baltic Offensive Operation and the Kurland Bridgehead
196
 
In contrast, the rationale for the retention of the Kuban Bridgehead was ostensibly 
offensive, as a springboard for a renewed offensive into the Caucasus. The possibility of 
this occurring was small from the start and became increasingly implausible as Soviet 
offensives pushed westwards along large sections of the front. The complete failure of 
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Operation Neptune showed with absolute certainty that Seventeenth Army had lost any 
offensive capacity or purpose in the Kuban. At the very most, it could be argued that it 
provided a buffer against an attack against the Crimea across the Kerch Strait, although 
given that the Soviets were content to wait six months after the land connection to the 
Crimea was severed before they launched a concerted attack on the peninsula, even 
after the Kerch–Eltigen Operation had gained a reasonably significant foothold, this 
appears not to have been a major priority. Ultimately, Seventeenth Army was one of 
many German units and formations that fell victim to Hitler’s “stand fast” orders. The 
first such order was issued in January 1942 to a series of German pockets in the 
northern and central parts of the front that had been bypassed and isolated by the 
Soviet winter counter-offensive. The successful defence and relief of pockets at 
Demyansk, Rzhev, and Mozhaisk, among others, was ultimately due to a combination of 
the tenacity and skill of the defending troops and the Luftwaffe crews that supplied 
some of them by air and the Soviet command’s over-ambitious aims for their offensives. 
Unsurprisingly, Hitler saw only the former and from then on became increasingly 
obsessive about holding ground, regardless of the ability of the forces to do so or of the 
resulting, often disastrous, consequences.197     
The failure of the Soviet spring and summer offensives to force a decisive breakthrough 
and push the Germans from the Kuban can be attributed to a number of factors, 
including a lack of forces. Through 1943, North Caucasus fielded four combined-armies 
and one air army, far below the strengths of some other Fronts at key locations and 
times. In early 1943, for example, Western Front, which was deployed on the vital 
Moscow axis, contained eleven armies, one air army and three independent tank corps. 
As the focus switched to Kursk in the summer, Central and Voronezh Fronts each had six 
armies, including one tank army, one air army and two tank corps.  Armour in particular 
was concentrated at these key sectors: North Caucasus Front did not field any tank or 
mechanised unit larger than a brigade, meaning that strong armoured second-echelon 
forces were rarely available to exploit the penetrations that were forced in the German 
lines on a number of occasions.198  
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Supplying the forces in the Caucasus was another major difficulty. At the extreme 
southern end of the front, the Kuban was far from the two main production areas in the 
Upper Volga and Ural regions. Much of the equipment coming from these areas had to 
be shipped across the Caspian Sea, as did lend-lease supplies coming through the 
Persian corridor. The poor road and rail network meant that many supplies were then 
brought to the southern Black Sea ports and transported by ship to the ports closer to 
the front line, particularly during the early months of 1943, when heavy rains washed 
away many roads.199 Food was also often in short supply, even though the Kuban Steppe 
is a rich agricultural area. In 1937, 409,800 hectares in the Krasnodar Krai administrative 
region had been given over to cereal farming, but even before the German occupation, 
the effects of the war had caused production to plummet, with the July 1942 harvest 
delivering only about ten percent of the expected yield. In 1943, although a large part of 
the agricultural region had been recaptured, the poor weather took a further toll on the 
harvest and the yields at most of the state farms remained well below expectations.200  
Sniper Maria Galyshkina of the 57th Marine Infantry Brigade recalled that in March 1943, 
rations could consist of a handful of mouldy corn and that soldiers resorted to throwing 
grenades into rivers to try to catch a few fish. She also described how ammunition 
supplies were virtually exhausted.201  
Finally, the performance of and quality of the Red Army must be examined. The Kuban 
campaign took place in what Soviet and Russian historians have termed the second 
period of the Great Patriotic War, which began with the counter-offensive at Stalingrad 
in November 1942 and lasted until the end of 1943. This was the transitional phase 
between the first period, in which the Red Army and the Soviet state were struggling for 
survival, and the third period, in which the Red Army had decisively seized the strategic 
initiative. It was during the second period of the war that the Red Army restructured 
itself into a modern force that was capable of matching and eventually defeating the 
Wehrmacht, but this transition was not straightforward and there were many painful 
lessons.202 In a rare candid passage in his book, Grechko briefly discusses some of the 
failings during the campaign in the Caucasus, notably the shambles of the Yuzhnaya 
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Ozereika landing and the Krasnodar offensive operation in February 1943, in which he 
claims that the overly cautious approach of the North Caucasus Front command allowed 
the retreating Germans time to reorganise their forces and establish new defensive 
positions. Cooperation between armour and infantry was often poor, with tanks 
frequently becoming isolated from the supporting infantry.203 
The greatest failing, however, was arguably the complete inability of the Soviet forces to 
disrupt German shipping between the Crimea and Kuban. On 5 February, the People’s 
Commissar of the Navy Nikolai Kuznetsov issued a decree ordering that a blockade of all 
German-held ports between Anapa and Feodosiya be implemented using aircraft, 
surface ships and submarines. After about a month, during which these forces failed to 
sink even a single German vessel (a few barges and small boats sank after hitting mines), 
the effort was abandoned. Through the spring and summer, sporadic attempts to attack 
German shipping from the air and with torpedo boats were launched. This did force the 
Germans to restrict their use of the port at Anapa and to increase convoy protection, 
but the volume of traffic between the Crimea and Kuban was barely affected. As 
Seventeenth Army began its withdrawal, the Black Sea Fleet was given the task of 
attacking the convoys, but a series of attempted torpedo-boat raids into the Kerch Strait 
achieved nothing. Air attacks succeeded in sinking one German torpedo boat, two 
minelayers, two landing barges and three lighters, but this was just a tiny fraction of the 
240 vessels of various types and sizes that were used in the evacuation. The final phase 
of the withdrawal was completely unhindered after the destroyer leader Kharkov and 
the destroyers Besposchadniy and Baikiy were sunk by a Stuka attack on 6 February, 
with the loss of over 650 lives. After this disaster, Stavka suspended all operations by 
large ships in the Black Sea.204 The Luftwaffe played a valuable role in the supply and 
evacuation operations, but it had lost almost 500 transport aircraft as well as many 
fighters, bombers and Stukas at Stalingrad and it is implausible that it would have been 
able to maintain supplies to Seventeenth Army if the Soviet blockade effort had been 
able to significantly disrupt sea transport.205  
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The resources of the Caucasus, particularly its oil, were vital to the Soviet economy in 
the early years of the war. In 1940, for example, the Baku fields supplied just over 
seventy percent of all the oil extracted in the Soviet Union. These oil reserves also lay 
behind the planning for Operation Blue, as Germany had no reserves of its own. 
Ironically, before the war, the Western powers had briefly considered bombing the Baku 
fields, using British and French aircraft based in Iraq and Syria, respectively, as a means 
of ensuring that oil could not be transferred to Germany under the Molotov–Ribbentrop 
Pact. As the German advance began to present a serious threat in the summer of 1942, 
however, production was dramatically scaled back and many wells were capped. In 
October over 10,000 oil workers were transferred to regions including the Volga, the 
Urals and Central Asia to develop new fields. This enterprise was so successful that even 
as the threat to the Caucasus receded and production was restarted, the relative 
importance of the Baku fields to the Soviet war effort and economy had already began 
to decrease.206 In a relatively short period of time, therefore, the combination of the 
declining strength of the Wehrmacht to the point where offensive operations were no 
longer possible and the Soviet focus on other sectors of the front as the threat to the 
Caucasus receded and new oil reserves were opened saw the Kuban and North Caucasus 
region decline from being of vital strategic importance to both sides to a secondary, 
almost forgotten, front that is now merely a footnote in many histories of the war.   
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Appendix I: Orders of Battle 
Seventeenth Army, 5 February 1943207 
Armeeoberkommando 17 
LII Army Corps 
 
13th Panzer Division 
2nd Romanian Mountain Division 
50th Infantry Division 
370th Infantry Division 
 
XXXXIX Mountain Corps 
 
46th Infantry Division 
1st Mountain Division 
4th Mountain Division 
 
XXXXIV Army Corps (Gruppe de Angelis) 
 
 198th Infantry Division 
 125th Infantry Division 
 101st Jäger Division 
97th Jäger Division 
 
Romanian Cavalry Corps 
9th Romanian Cavalry Division 
6th Romanian Cavalry Division 
  
V Army Corps 
 
5th Luftwaffe Field Division 
19th Romanian Infantry Division 
3rd Romanian Mountain Division 
9th Infantry Division 
73rd Infantry Division 
10th Romanian Infantry Division 
 
 
The Slovakian Mobile Division was being transported out of the Kuban Bridgehead on 
this date. 
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Seventeenth Army, 8 March 1943208 
Armeeoberkommando 17 
 
XXXXIX Mountain Corps 
 
13th Panzer Division 
2nd Romanian Mountain Division 
50th Infantry Division 
370th Infantry Division 
4th Mountain Division 
1st Mountain Division 
 
XXXXIV Corps 
 
19th Romanian Infantry Division 
101st Jäger Division 
97th Jäger Division 
3rd Romanian Mountain Division 
9th Infantry Division 
 
V Corps (Gruppe Wetzel) 
 
73rd Infantry Division 
125th Infantry Division 
 
Romanian Cavalry Corps 
9th Romanian Cavalry Division 
6th Romanian Cavalry Division 
 
 
The 46th Infantry Division was being transported out of the Kuban Bridgehead on this 
date. 
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Seventeenth Army, 25 June 1943209 
Armeeoberkommando 17 
 
XXXXIX Mountain Corps 
  
125th Infantry Division 
Kampfgruppe Brücker 
50th Infantry Division 
370th Infantry Division 
 
XXXXIV Army Corps 
  
3rd Romanian Mountain Division 
 10th Romanian Infantry Division 
79th Infantry Division 
101st Jäger Division 
97th Jäger Division 
 
V Army Corps (Gruppe Wetzel) 
  
9th Infantry Division 
Kampfgruppe von Bünau (73rd Infantry Division + 1st Romanian Mountain 
Division) 
 Kampfgruppe Kress (4th Mountain Division + 6th Romanian Cavalry Division) 
 19th Romanian Infantry Division 
 9th Romanian Infantry Division 
 
 Romanian Cavalry Corps 
 9th Romanian Cavalry Division 
 19th Romanian Infantry Division  
 
Army Reserve 
  
 98th Infantry Division 
 13th Panzer Division 
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 ‘Gliederung der Armee (Stand von 25.6.43), AOK 17, Ia Nr. 12820/43 g. Kdos.‘ in 
Kriegsgliederung der Armee, 5. Feb. – 25. Juni 1943 (BArch RH 20-17/179). 
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North Caucasus Front, 1 May 1943210  
9th Army 
9th Rifle Corps 
 34th Rifle Brigade 
 43rd Rifle Brigade 
 157th Rifle Brigade 
 256th Rifle Brigade 
 
11th Rifle Corps 
 19th Rifle Brigade 
 84th Rifle Brigade 
 131st Rifle Brigade 
 
276th Rifle Division 
351st Rifle Division 
57th Rifle Brigade 
 
 
18th Army 
16th Rifle Corps 
 51st Rifle Brigade 
 107th Rifle Brigade 
 165th Rifle Brigade 
 
20th Rifle Corps 
 8th Guards Rifle Brigade 
 83rd Rifle Brigade 
 255th Rifle Brigade 
 
22nd Rifle Corps 
 103rd Rifle Brigade 
 111th Rifle Brigade 
 
176th Rifle Division 
318th Rifle Division 
 
 
37th Army 
295th Rifle Division 
389th Rifle Division 
395th Rifle Division 
 
56th Army 
3rd Rifle Corps 
             9th Guards Rifle Brigade 
             83rd Guards Rifle Brigade 
             9th Rifle Brigade 
             60th Rifle Brigade 
             155th Rifle Brigade 
 
10th Guards Rifle Corps 
             4th Guards Rifle Brigade 
             5th Guards Rifle Brigade 
             6th Guards Rifle Brigade 
             7th Guards Rifle Brigade 
             9th Guards Rifle Brigade 
             10th Guards Rifle Brigade 
 
11th Guards Rifle Corps 
             2nd Guards Rifle Division 
             32nd Guards Rifle Division 
 
20th Mechanised Brigade 
242nd Mechanised Brigade 
61st Rifle Division 
216th Rifle Division 
317th Rifle Division 
383rd Rifle Division 
92nd Tank Brigade 
151st Tank Brigade 
 
 
58th Army 
77th Rifle Division 
89th Rifle Division 
414th Rifle Division 
417th Rifle Division 
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 Russian Military Forum: Kuban 1943: 
http://www.network54.com/Forum/116312/message/1104548561/Kuban+194 (30 May 2014). 
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North Caucasus Front, July 1943211 
108th Guards Rifle Division 
109th Guards Rifle Division 
124th Heavy Howitzer Brigade 
125th Heavy Howitzer Brigade 
255th Naval Infantry Brigade 
5th Guards Tank Brigade 
63rd Tank Brigade 
83rd Naval Infantry Brigade 
 
 
18th Army 
10th Guards Corps 
 5th Guards Rifle Brigade 
 6th Guards Rifle Brigade 
 7th Guards Rifle brigade 
 77th Mountain Division 
 
16th Rifle Corps 
 2nd Guards Rifle Division 
 32nd Guards Rifle Division 
 
20th Rifle Corps 
 
22nd Rifle Corps 
 318th Rifle Division 
 417th Rifle Division 
 
132nd Tank Battalion 
176th Rifle Division 
216th Rifle Division 
8th Guards Rifle Brigade 
81st Naval Infantry Brigade 
107th Rifle Brigade 
 
58th Army 
 295th Rifle Division 
 414th Rifle Division 
 77th Rifle Division 
89th Rifle Division 
 
56th Army 
3rd Mountain Corps 
 242nd Mountain Division 
 83rd Mountain Division 
 9th Mountain Division 
 
20th Mountain Division 
257th Rifle Division 
317th Rifle Division 
328th Rifle Division 
339th Rifle Division 
353rd Rifle Division 
383rd Rifle Division 
61st Rifle Division 
62nd Artillery Brigade 
 
9th Army 
11th Rifle Corps 
 131st Rifle Brigade 
 19th Rifle Brigade 
 57th Rifle Brigade 
 84th Naval Rifle Brigade 
 
11th Guards Corps 
 55th Guards Rifle Division 
10th Guards Rifle Brigade 
 9th Guards Rifle Brigade 
 133rd Rifle Brigade 
43rd Rifle Brigade  
 
9th Independent Corps 
301st Rifle Division 
157th Rifle Brigade 
 256th Rifle Brigade 
34th Rifle Brigade 
 
276th Rifle Division 
351st Rifle Division 
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 Kursk – Russian OB – North Caucasus Front: 
http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/town/avenue/vy75/rusobnc.htm (28 May 2014). 
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Appendix II: Biographical Sketches 
 
Allmendinger, Karl
212
 
3 February 1891 (Abtsgmünd, Württemberg) – 2 October 
1965 (Ellwangen, Baden-Württemberg) 
 
Allmendinger served in a fusilier regiment during the First 
World War and was retained in the 100,000-strong 
Reichswehr after the war. During the campaign in France, he 
was on the staff of V Corps, and in October 1940, he took 
command of 5
th
 Infantry Division, which was part of Army 
Group Centre during Barbarossa. He spent the first half of 
1943 as an instructor on divisional command courses in 
Berlin, before taking command of V Corps on 1 July. In July 
1944, after the loss of the Crimea, he was placed on the 
Fuhrer Reserve list. He was arrested by U.S. forces at the end 
of the war, but was released in late 1947. 
Awards: Knight’s Cross (17 Jul. 1941), Oak Leaves (13 Dec. 
1942) 
 
de Angelis, Maximilian
213
 
2 October 1889 (Budapest) – 6. December 1974 (Graz) 
De Angelis served in the Austrian Army during the First World 
War, and played a major role in the integration of Austrian 
forces into the Wehrmacht. In the summer of 1939, he 
commanded 76
th 
Infantry Division in the French campaign 
before being transferred to Poland and then to southern 
Russia. He took command of XXXXIV Corps in January 1942 
and held this position almost continuously until April 1944, 
when he was moved to Sixth Army and then Second Panzer 
Army. After the war, he was imprisoned in Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union and was released in 1955. Awards: Knight’s 
Cross (9 Feb. 1942), Oak Leaves (12 Nov. 1943). 
 
Brezhnev, Leonid Ilich
214
 
19 December 1906 (Kamenskoe, now Dniprodzerzhinsk, 
Ukraine) – 10 November 1982 (Moscow) 
 
Brezhnev spent his early career as a land surveyor and 
metallurgical engineer. He joined the Communist Party in 
1931, and in 1939 he was appointed Secretary of the 
Dnepropetrovsk Regional Committee. During the war, he held 
senior positions in the political departments of Southern 
Front, the Black Sea Group, 18
th
 Army and 4
th
 Ukrainian Front. 
After the war, he rose through the party ranks, and on 14 
October 1964, he was elected as First Secretary of the Central 
Committee, effectively becoming the leader of the country 
until his death in 1982. Awards: Hero of the Soviet Union 
(four times), Order of Lenin (eight times), numerous others. 
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 http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Personenregister/A/Allmendinger-R.htm (5 June 
2014). 
213
 http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Personenregister/A/AngelisM-R.htm (22 May 2014). 
214
 http://www.warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=1614 (9 June 2014). 
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Grechko, Andrei Antonovich
215
 
17 Oct. 1903 (Golodaevka, Rostov Oblast) – 26 Apr. 1976 
(Moscow)  
 
Grechko served in the 11
th
 Cavalry Division in the Civil War 
and participated in counter-insurgency operations in 
Chechnya and Dagestan in the mid-1920s. He graduated from 
the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow in 1936. During the 
Caucasus campaign, he commanded 12
th
, 47
th
 and 18
th
 
Armies, and was subsequently appointed Deputy Commander 
of 1
st
 Ukrainian Front. After the war, he commanded the Kiev 
Military District and Soviet forces in Germany. He was 
appointed Deputy Defence Minister in November 1957 and 
Defence Minister in April 1967, holding this position until his 
death. Awards: Hero of the Soviet Union (twice). 
 
Jaenecke, Erwin
216
 
22 April 1890 (Freren, Lower Saxony) – 3 July 1960 (Cologne) 
Jaenecke served as an engineer in the First World War. In the 
inter-war years he took up a wide range of positions, 
including a posting to the Condor Legion in the Spanish Civil 
War. After several quartermaster posts, he took command of 
389
th
 Infantry Division on 1 February 1942. The division took 
part in some of the bloodiest fighting in Stalingrad, and 
Jaenecke was wounded on 17 January 1943 and was one of 
the last senior officers to be flown out of the pocket. After a 
short spell with LXXXII Corps in France, he took command of 
Seventeenth Army in June 1943. He was court-martialled and 
forced into retirement after the loss of the Crimea. He was 
held as a prisoner of war in the Soviet Union until 1955. 
Awards: Knight’s Cross (9 October 1942). 
 
Konrad, Rudolf
217
 
7 March 1891 (Kulmbach, Bavaria) – 10 June 1964 (Munich) 
Konrad served as an artillery officer in the First World War, 
and on the staff of the 7
th
 Division in the post-war 
Reichswehr. After several regimental command positions, he 
held staff positions in the XVIII Corps, with which he took part 
in the Polish Campaign in 1939, and then with Second Army 
in the French Campaign. He was appointed to command 7
th
 
Mountain Division in the autumn of 1941, but had not taken 
up the position before he was promoted to command XXXXIX 
Mountain Corps. After the destruction of the corps in the 
Crimea, he was transferred to the Führer Reserve. In January 
1945, he took command of LXVIII Corps, which fought in 
Hungary and surrendered in southern Austria. Awards: 
Knights Cross (1 Aug. 1942). 
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 http://www.warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=1225 (9 June 2014). 
216
 http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Personenregister/J/JaeneckeE-R.htm (9 June 2014). 
217
 Picture: http://www.wwii-photos-maps.com/generalofficers/slides/Rudolf%20Konrad.html,  
   Text: http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Personenregister/K/KonradRudolf-R.htm (27 May 
2014). 
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Kunikov, Tsesar Lvovich
218
 
23 June 1909 (Rostov-on-Don) – 14 February 1943 
(Gelendzhik) 
 
Kunikov worked as a mechanic in Moscow before he joined 
the Frunze Naval Academy in Leningrad, but left after a few 
months due to ill-health. He held a number of military 
engineering positions in Moscow before being transferred 
south, where he became a patrol boat battalion commander 
in the Azov Flotilla. In July 1942, he was appointed 
commander of the Black Sea Fleet’s 305
th
 Independent 
Marine Infantry Battalion. After leading the landing operation 
at Stanichka on the night of 3 – 4 February 1943, he was 
wounded by a mine explosion on 12 February and died in 
hospital two days later. Awards: Hero of the Soviet Union and 
Orders of Lenin, Red Banner and Alexander Nevsky (all 
posthumous). 
 
Oktyabrskiy, Filipp Sergeyevich
219
 
23 October 1899 (Lukshino, Kalinin Oblast) – 8 July 1969 
(Sevastopol) 
 
Oktyabrskiy joined the Red Navy in 1918. He graduated from 
Petrograd University in 1922 and briefly worked in the Red 
Army’s propaganda department, before undertaking further 
study at the Frunze Naval Academy. Through the 1930s, he 
attained increasingly senior commands in the Baltic and 
Pacific Fleets and the Amur Flotilla. He was appointed 
commander of the Black Sea Fleet in March 1939. He was 
removed from this command after the Yuzhnaya Ozereika 
debacle, but reinstated a year later. After the war, he served 
as Deputy Commander of the Navy and headed the Nakhimov 
Naval Academy in Sevastopol. Awards: Hero of the Soviet 
Union (20 Feb. 1958). 
 
Ruoff, Richard
220
 
18 August 1883 (Meesbach, Württemberg) – 30 March 1967 
(Tübingen, Baden-Württemberg) 
 
Ruoff served in the infantry in the First World War, winning 
the Iron Cross. After the war, he held battalion and 
regimental commands, before taking up a number of staff 
positions in the expanding Wehrmacht. In May 1939, he was 
appointed commander of V Corps, which participated in the 
French campaign and in the Netherlands, before moving east. 
In early 1942, he commanded Fourth Panzer Army, before 
taking over Seventeenth Army on 1 June. On his replacement 
by Jaenecke just over a year later, he was transferred to the 
Führer Reserve. Awards: Knights Cross (29 June 1941). 
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 http://www.warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=258 (22 May 2014). 
219
 http://www.warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=1733 (29 May 2014). 
220
 Picture: http://www.wwii-photos-maps.com/battle-of-
stalingrad/slides/Richard%20Ruoff.html  
  Text: http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Personenregister/R/RuoffRichard-R.htm (28 May 
2014). 
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Vladimirskiy, Lev Anatolevich
221
  
27 September 1903 (Guryev, now Atyrau, Kazakhstan) – 7 
September 1973 (Moscow) 
 
Vladimirskiy joined the Red Army during the Civil War and the 
Black Sea Fleet in 1932. During the Spanish Civil War, he 
served on a French ship that supplied weapons to Communist 
forces. He was appointed Rear-Admiral just before the 
German invasion, and participated in the evacuations of 
Odessa and Sevastopol. He took command of the fleet 
(replacing Oktyabrskiy) in May 1943, overseeing the Kerch-
Eltigen operation. He was transferred to the Baltic Fleet as a 
squadron commander in May 1944. In 1954 he was 
appointed chief of the General Staff of the Navy. Awards: 
Order of Lenin (twice), Order of the red Banner (three times). 
 
Wetzel, Wilhelm
222
 
17 July 1888 (Sarbke, Pomerania) – 4 July 1964 (Hamburg) 
 
Wetzel served with distinction in the First World War and 
remained in the Reichswehr after the war. In the summer of 
1939, he was appointed to command the newly-formed 255
th
 
Infantry Division, which he led in France and in Army Group 
Centre in the initial stages of the attack on the Soviet Union. 
In January 1942, he was promoted to command V Corps, 
holding this position until July 1943. After a spell in the 
Führer Reserve, he held a number of administrative 
commands, including LXVI Reserve Corps and Wahrkreis 
(Military District) X. 
 
Awards:  Knight’s Cross (7 Aug. 1942) 
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 http://flot.com/blog/historyofNVMU/1258.php?sphrase_id=7163983 (11 June 2014). 
222
 Picture: http://www.wwii-photos-maps.com/generalofficers/slides/Wilhelm%20Wetzel.html,  
  Text: http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Personenregister/W/WetzelWilhelm.htm (22 May 
2014). 
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Appendix III: Awards 
 
Kuban Shield223 
The Kuban Shield was instituted on 21 
September 1943.  For army and auxiliary 
forces, the following criteria were 
required for an award: 
 To have served in the 
bridgehead for at least 60 days 
 To have been wounded in the 
bridgehead 
 To have served during one of 
twelve specific major operations 
Awards to Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine 
personnel were assessed using a points 
system.  The shield is made from sheet 
metal or zinc, treated with a bronzed 
wash. 
 
Medal for the Defence of the 
Caucasus224 
This award was established on 1 May 
1944 and was awarded to all military 
personnel and civilians who took part in 
the defence of the Caucasus. 
Confirmation of at least 3 months 
service in the Caucasus between July 
1942 and October 1943 was required. 
The medal is made of brass, and about 
870,000 were issued. 
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 Picture: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Kubanschild.jpg. Text: http://www.wehrmacht-
awards.com/campaign_awards/shields/kuban.htm (29 May 2014). 
224
 Picture: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Defense_of_the_caucasus_OBVERSE.jpg. Text: 
http://soviet-awards.com/medals13.htm (29 May 2014). 
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